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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FURNISHING
PUBLICLY FINANCED TRANSPORTATION TO
PRIVATE AND PAROCHIAL SCHOOL
STUDENTS IN MISSOURI
GERALD TOCKMAN*
The great condition of religious liberty is that it be maintained
free from sustenance, as also from other interferences, by the
state. For when it comes to rest upon that secular foundation it
vanishes with the resting.'
The proceedings of the House Judiciary Committee of the Seventy-
Second General Assembly of the State of Missouri in connection with
its consideration of House Bill No. 367, providing for the free trans-
portation of public, private and parochial school students, brought to
the fore the divisive effect and emotional reactions with which such
legislation so often becomes embroiled. The volume of attendance at
the public hearings conducted by the Committee2 in considering the
proposed legislation and the force and sincerity of both proponents
and opponents of the proposed legislation in presenting their views
with regard to it 3 amply demonstrated the viability of that particular
wisdom upon which both federal and state constitutional proscriptions
against interference by government with, and aid or support by gov-
ernment to, religion were and are based. Similarly, the withdrawal of
large numbers of parochial school students from the parochial school
system and their token enrollment in the public schools of the State,4
resulting from the failure of the proposed legislation to clear the
Committee, demonstrated the equally uncontroverted fact that the
parochial and private school systems have assumed and carry financial
expenditures and outlay which, but for their existence, would impress
a significant burden upon the State.
The failure of the House Judiciary Committee to report out and
* Associate, Lewis, Rice, Tucker, Allen and Chubb, St. Louis, Missouri.
1. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53 (1946) (dissenting opinion of
Rutledge, J.).
2. See, e.g., St. Louis Globe-Democrat, April 4, 1963, p. 6A, col. 1; St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, April 4, 1963, p. 3A, col. 2.
3. See, e.g., St. Louis Globe-Democrat, May 7, 1963, p. 1A, col. 8.
4. See Hermann, The Church School Issue, The National Observer, May 13,
1963, p. 7, cols. 3-6; St. Louis Globe-Democrat, May 8, 1963, p. 1A, col. 2; St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, May 8, 1963, p. 1A, col. 1; St. Louis Globe-Democrat, May 7,
1963, p. 1A, col. 7; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 7, 1963, p. 1A, col. 1; St. Louis
Globe-Democrat, May 3, 1963, p. 1A, col. 5.
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present House Bill No. 367 to the Legislature also focused attention
upon that question apparently unanswered by the Supreme Court of
Missouri in its decision in MeVey v. Hawkins.5 In the McVey case,
the narrow ground chosen by the court in voiding the use of public
school transportation facilities for the conveyance of parochial school
students6 expressed the court's reluctance to consider, if not its de-
termination to leave open, the question of whether general revenues
may be constitutionally used in Missouri in providing transportation
to non-public school students, and it was the intendment of House Bill
No. 367 to fit within the area of unresolved constitutional permissi-
bility apparently contained in that case.7
5. 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953).
6. In the McVey case, the plaintiffs, taxpayer residents of the defendant school
district, sought an injunction against the use of public school buses for the trans-
portation of school pupils attending parochial schools in another school district,
part of the way being within the defendant school district. The plaintiffs con-
tended that three constitutional provisions had been violated by the school board's
action in furnishing such transportation: the first providing that the "public
school fund" is to be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance of
free public schools (Mo. CONST. art. IX, §§ 3, 5); the second prohibiting any ex-
penditure to aid or support any school controlled by church or sectarian denomi-
nation (Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 8); and the third precluding the spending of public
money "directly or indirectly" in aid of any church, sect or religious denomination
(Mo. CONST. art. I, § 7). The court found that a portion of the funds being used
by the defendant school district in furnishing the contested transportation was
derived from the income of the public school fund and stated the issue as follows:
In view of the issues presented on this appeal, we think the essential question
is whether the use of the public school moneys, to wit, the incidental funds
of the district, for defraying the expenses of transporting the parochial
school children to, or part way to and from, a private school is a use for the
purpose of "establishing and maintaining free public schools and for no
other uses or purposes whatsoever," as provided by See. 5, Art. IX of the
Constitution .... Also involved is the question of whether the income from
the State Public School Fund is applied "to the support of free public
schools," as provided by Sec. 3, Art. IX and whether such income and the
other moneys appropriated are properly used within the meaning of the act
of the Legislature setting the fund aside "to be used for the support of thefree public schools" and "to be apportioned and distributed for the support
of the free public schools." McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 53-54, 258 S.W.2d927, 932 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
The court held that the use of the fund mentioned for the provision of transporta-
tion to parochial school children was not a use for the establishment and main-
tenance of free public schools and therefore not within the purpose for which the
fund was dedicated and appropriated; on this basis, that such use of the "public
school fund" transgressed the first constitutional provisions asserted by the plain-
tiffs, the court enjoined such use of the fund and ordered that the transportation
involved be discontinued.
7. See, e.g., H.B. 367, 72d General Assembly (1963) p. 8, lines 5-15, which
provides:
All moneys received from the state for school transportation and all moneysderived from taxation and set aside for transportation purposes by the board
of education or board of directors shall be deposited in and credited to the
district school transportation fund. No moneys from the state public school
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In McVey v. Hawkins the court, by limiting its decision to a de-
termination that the non-public school transportation there involved
could not be financed by the expenditure of funds constitutionally
interdicted from use for purposes other than the establishment and
maintenance of free public schools, refused to pass upon the conten-
tion that such expenditure could be sustained as a valid exercise of
the state's police or welfare powers.8 House Bill No. 367, in providing
for the establishment of a transportation fund comprised of general
revenues other than those constitutionally inhibited to the use of the
free public schools, sought to overcome the only apparent constitu-
tional proscription against furnishing transportation to non-public
school students contained in the McVey decision and premised the ex-
penditure of such general revenues upon the ability of the state to
utilize tax-raised funds in carrying out and fulfilling those public
purposes contained within the valid exercise of the state's general
police and welfare powers. In thus framing the provision of publicly-
financed transportation to school students as the exercise of the state's
police or welfare powers, the issue of whether the furnishing of such
transportation would constitute the use of public funds for other than
a public purpose9 or would transgress constitutional provisions assur-
fund shall be deposited in or credited to any school transportation fund
hereby established. All costs of free transportation of public, private, and
parochial school pupils to and from school and all costs of administration of
the fund shall be paid from the school transportation fund of the district.
(Emphasis added.)
8. We need not review the cases cited in support of respondents' conten-
tion that the transportation at public expense of all school children to
and from whatever schools they may attend (public or private, sec-
tarian or non-sectarian) is a valid, constitutional and lawful exercise
of the police power of the state, because in this case we have a very
different question, to wit, can such transportation be had to a private
school at the expense of the public school fund and with funds limited
by the constitution to the exclusive purpose of establishing and main-
taining free public schools. McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 55, 258
S.W.2d 927, 933 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
9. Mo. CONST. art. III, § 36 provides, in part, as follows:
All revenue collected and money received by the state shall go into the
treasury and the general assembly shall have no power to divert the same
or permit the withdrawal of money from the treasury, except in pursuance
of appropriations made by law.
Mo. CONST. art. III, § 39 provides, in part, as follows:
The general assembly shall not have power:
(1) To give or lend or to authorize the giving or lending of the credit of the
state in aid or to any person, association, municipal or other corpora-
tion;
(2) To pledge the credit of the state for the payment of the liabilities,
present or prospective, of any individual, association, municipal or
other corporation ....
Mo. CONST. art. X, § 3 provides, in part, as follows:
Taxes may be levied and collected for public purposes only, and shall be
uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the
authority levying the tax.
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ing the separation of church and state0 were subsumed by the argu-
ment that the failure to extend such "welfare" benefits to pupils
enrolled in the private and parochial school systems would discrimi-
nate against and interfere with the ability of such students to exercise
their constitutional rights to receive instruction in educational facili-
ties of their own choosing. This invocation of the state's police or
welfare powers, and the positing of the existence of a public purpose,
has often been used as an argument for, and has sometimes success-
fully resulted in, the expenditure of public monies for constitutionally
proscribed purposes.:"
The contentions that the furnishing of transportation to assist
those students in need of the same in the fulfillment of their obliga-
tions under compulsory education laws constitutes public welfare
legislation, and that the benefits of such legislation cannot be constitu-
tionally withheld from any member of that class of the public intended
to be benefited thereby merely because of such member's exercise of
religious freedom in attending a parochial school or exercise of the
constitutional right to receive instruction in educational institutions
other than the public school system, have furnished an emotionally
persuasive argument to various courts. However, those courts, in
accepting the initial contention that the furnishing of such transpor-
tation constitutes the enlightened extension of the state's police and
welfare powers, have lost sight of the basic constitutional precepts and
principles supporting and embodied in limitations upon the state's
ability to use public monies and proscriptions against interference by
the state with religion, by aid to it or restrictions upon the free exer-
cise of it. It is the purpose of this article to set forth those matters
which are relevant to consideration of the constitutional question in-
volved in connection with furnishing publicly-financed transportation
to private and parochial school students in order to delineate that area
of controversy with which any intelligible opinion on this question
must deal. The objective of this article is to present an unbiased
analysis of the legal factors involved, giving neither succor to those
who raise the specter of papal tyranny nor assuagement to those who
asseverate the progressing "godlessness" of this country.
I. VALIDITY OF THE USE OF TAX-RAISED FUNDS-
THE EXISTENCE OF A PUBLIC PURPOSE
The provisions of state constitutions set forth a body of limitations
upon the powers of the legislature and the other departments of state
10. MO. CONST. art. I, §§ 5-7, art. IX, § 8.
11. See LANouE, DECISION FOR THE SIXTIES: PUBLIC FUNDS FOR PAROCIIL
SCHOOLS? 6 (Department of Religious Liberty, National Council of Churches
1963).
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government. 12 The most prominent limitation is that restricting the
ability of the state to levy and collect taxes and to expend the funds
thereby obtained; such restrictions upon the power of the state to
appropriate and expend funds derived from the public through taxa-
tion generally prescribe those limitations inherent in the requirement
that such appropriations and expenditures be made for public purposes
only. 3 In determining whether that authority of law necessary to the
appropriation and expenditure of public funds is present, the first and
fundamental inquiry is whether such funds are to be used for a public
as opposed to a private purpose." The scope of such inquiry is not
necessarily limited to a determination of the nature or character of
the recipient to whom or for whose benefit such funds are appropri-
ated and expended but includes the ascertainment of the purpose of
the payment made. Thus, the use of public monies within the limita-
tions of the existence of a public purpose may be found where the
recipient of those funds performs a paramount public service or func-
tion of a type or nature essential to the well-being of the state and its
citizenry, and such service or function is of a type which the state
lawfully could perform but such performance has neither been under-
taken nor fully assumed.' 5 In such limited circumstances, the appro-
12. State v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 239 Mo. 196, 230, 143 S.W. 785, 793 (1912);
see 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 3-6 (8th ed. 1927).
13. See statutes cited note 9 supra; LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND
OF COLUMBIA UNERSITY, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 992-93 (2d ed.
1959).
14. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); Thompson
v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937); City of Parkersburg v.
Brown, 106 U.S. 487 (1883); Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
655 (1875); Lien v. City of Ketchikan, 383 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1963); Alameda
County v. Janssen, 16 Cal. 2d 276, 106 P.2d 11 (1940) ; San Diego County v. Ham-
mond, 6 Cal. 2d 709, 59 P.2d 478 (1936); Wines v. Garrison, 190 Cal. 650, 214 Pac.
56 (1923); Veterans' Welfare Bd. v. Riley, 189 Cal. 159, 208 Pac. 678 (1922);
City of Daytona Beach v. King, 132 Fla. 273, 181 So. 1 (1938) ; Krebs v. Board of
Trustees of Teachers' Retirement Sys., 410 Ill. 435, 102 N.E.2d 321 (1951);
Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953); Opinions of the Justices,
320 Mass. 773, 67 N.E.2d 588 (1946); Cleveland v. City of Detroit, 324 Mich. 527,
37 N.W.2d 625 (1949); Mills v. Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 Pac. 332 (1926);
Hoyt v. Broome County, 285 N.Y. 402, 34 N.E.2d 481 (1941); People v. West-
chester County Nat'l Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 132 N.E. 241 (1921; Stein v. Brown,
125 Misc. 692, 211 N.Y. Supp. 822 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ; Brumley v. Baxter, 225 N.C.
691, 36 S.E.2d 281 (1945); Stutsman v. Arthur, 73 N.D. 504, 16 N.W.2d 449
(1944); Wheelon v. South Dakota Land Settlement Bd., 43 S.D. 551, 181 N.W.
359 (1921) ; State ex rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 430, 43 S.E.2d 805 (1947).
15. Lien v. City of Ketchikan, 383 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1963) (hospital services
for the needy); St. Hedwigs School v. Cook County, 289 Ill. 432, 124 N.E. 629
(1919) (school for the commission of juvenile delinquents); Dunn v. Chicago
Industrial School, 280 Ill. 613, 117 N.E. 735 (1917) (special school to which state
court was authorized to commit delinquents); St. Mary's Industrial School v.
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priation and expenditure of tax-raised funds in payment to various
bodies and institutions which are privately owned and operated for
the rendering of "public services" by them may be constitutional and
any "incidental" or "indirect" benefit or resultant advantage inuring
to such recipient would be immaterial."
Where "public services," which could lawfully be assumed and per-
formed by the state in the exercise of its police and welfare powers,
are rendered by privately owned and operated sectarian institutions,
state court decisions have reached differing conclusions concerning
the propriety of using the "payment for services" concept as a basis
for asserting the constitutionality of the appropriation and expendi-
ture of public funds to such institutionsY.3 Certain of those state court
decisions which have upheld the payment of public monies to such
institutions have stressed the fact that the services performed by the
institution involved are completely secular and unaffected by any sec-
tarian influence whatever ;", whereas other decisions, in upholding the
Brown, 45 Md. 310 (1876) (provision of care and training for foundlings, the
insane, the indigent and the infirm); St. Johns College v. Purnell, 23 Md. 629
(1865) (educational institution supplying specialized training); Allegheny County
School v. Maffit, 22 Md. 121 (1864) (educational institution supplying specialized
training); St. Johns College v. State, 15 Md. 330 (1859) (educational institution
supplying specialized training); Finan v. Cumberland, 154 Md. 563, 141 Atl. 269
(Ct. App. 1928) (hospital); Baltimore v. Keeley Institute, 81 Md. 106, 31 Atl. 437
(Ct. App. 1895) (provision of treatment for chronic alcoholism); Sargent v.
Board of Educ., 177 N.Y. 317, 69 N.E. 722 (1904), affirming 76 App. Div. 588,
79 N.Y. Supp. 127 (1902), affirming 35 Misc. 321, 71 N.Y. Supp. 954 (Sup. Ct.
1901) (orphanage); Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, 366 P.2d 533 (Ore. 1961)
(dictum), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962).
16. See cases cited note 15 supra.
17. Compare St. Hedwigs School v. Cook County, sup a note 15; Dunn v.
Chicago Industrial School, supra note 15; St. Mary's Industrial School v. Brown,
supra note 15; St. Johns College v. Purnell, supra note 15; Allegheny County
School v. Maffit, supra note 15; St. Johns College v. State, supra note 15; Finan
v. Cumberland, supra note 15; Baltimore v. Keeley Institute, supra note 15;
Sargent v. Board of Educ., supra note 15; St. Patricks Orphan Asylum v. Board
of Educ., 34 How. Pr. 227 (N.Y. 1867); People ex rel. The Roman Catholic Orphan
Asylum Soc'y v. Board of Educ., 13 Barb. 400 (N.Y. 1851) with Bennet v. City
of LaGrange, 153 Ga. 428, 112 S.E. 482 (1922) ; Cook County v. Chicago Industrial
School, 125 Ill. 540, 18 N.E. 183 (1888); State ex rel. Nevada Orphan Asylum v.
Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882); Collins v. Martin, 290 Pa. 388, 139 Atl. 122 (1927);
Synod of Dakota v. State, 2 S.D. 366, 50 N.W. 632 (1891) ; State ex rel. McPherren
v. Carter, 30 Wyo. 22, 215 Pac. 477 (1923).
18. Lien v. City of Ketchikan, 383 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1963); St. Mary's Indus-
trial School v. Brown, 45 Md. 310 (1876); St. Johns College v. Purnell, 23 Md.
629 (1865); Allegheny County School v. Maffit, 22 Md. 121 (1864); St. Johns
College v. State, 15 Md. 330 (1859) ; Finan v. Cumberland, 154 Md. 563, 141 Atl.
269 (Ct. App. 1928); Baltimore v. Keeley Institute, 81 Md. 106, 31 Atl. 437
(Ct. App. 1895); Sargent v. Board of Educ., 177 N.Y. 317, 69 N.E. 722 (1904),
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constitutionality of such payments, have implicitly recognized the
necessity of sacrificing constitutional principles requiring the separa-
tion of church and state to the urgent needs of the state and com-
munity.1'9 Other state courts have rejected the validity of the theory
of payment for secular services as a justification for the appropriation
and expenditure of public funds to sectarian institutions and, notwith-
standing the contention that a public function or service is being per-
formed thereby, have held that such payments transgress constitu-
tional restrictions upon the use of public funds for public purposes in
that they result, at least in part, in the relief and support of the sec-
tarian institution or body involved.20 In the majority of these deci-
sions, regardless of the particular result reached through application
of or refusal to apply the "payment for services" concept, the courts
have recognized the fundamental constitutional precept that only
where the appropriation and expenditure is lawfully authorized be-
cause the purpose of it is a public one, may tax-raised monies con-
stitutionally be used for the benefit of or paid to private individuals
or privately owned and operated bodies and institutions.
Although the state court decisions in the area of "payment for
services" are by no means conclusive with regard to the constitution-
ality of payment to sectarian institutions for the rendition of welfare
services to the state and its citizenry, each has recognized that which
is implicit in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in a
affirming 76 App. Div. 588, 79 N.Y. Supp. 127 (1902), affirming 35 Misc. 321,
71 N.Y. Supp. 954 (Sup. Ct. 1901).
19. St. Hedwigs School v. Cook County, 289 Ill. 432, 124 N.E. 629 (1919);
Dunn v. Chicago Industrial School, 280 Ill. 613, 117 N.E. 735 (1917) ; St. Patricks
Orphan Asylum v. Board of Educ., 34 How. Pr. 227 (N.Y. 1867); People ex rel.
The Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum Soc'y v. Board of Educ., 13 Barb. 400 (N.Y.
1851).
20. Bennet v. City of LaGrange, 153 Ga. 428, 112 S.E. 482 (1922) (contract
between municipality and sectarian institution, and payments to institution there-
under, for performance of city's charitable work held invalid); Cook County v.
Chicago Industrial School, 125 Ill. 540, 18 N.E. 183 (1888) (payments to correc-
tional institution to which court was authorized to commit delinquents held in-
valid because of sectarian influence); State ex rel. Nevada Orphan Asylum v.
Hallock, 16 Nev. (36 Pac. St. R.) 373 (1882) (payment to sectarian orphanage
held invalid notwithstanding the fact that such payment was made for the physical
necessities of wards only); Collins v. Martin, 290 Pa. 388, 139 Atl. 122 (1927)
(holding that department of welfare cannot expend funds appropriated for its
use for the treatment of indigent sick in sectarian hospitals and that denominating
what is secured in the treatment of indigent sick in such hospitals as "hospital
service" does not remove it from constitutional prohibitions) ; Synod of Dakota v.
State, 2 S.D. 366, 50 N.W. 632 (1891) (payments to sectarian institution for the
provision of specialized educational training in courses in public school teaching
held invalid); State ex rel. McPherren v. Carter, 30 Wyo. 22, 215 Pac. 477 (1923)
(payments for charitable services held invalid).
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similar such case, Bradfield v. Roberts,21 i.e., where such "services" are
rendered in the context of sectarian influences and controls, payment
for them out of public funds is unconstitutional. 22 State courts have
generally refused to apply the "payment for services" theory as a
means for the constitutional validation of the appropriation and ex-
penditure of public monies to, or in aid or support of, parochial and
private schools, notwithstanding the contention that the public re-
ceives a benefit from the operation of them through the increase in
educational facilities and through the spread and diffusion of knowl-
edge; noting that parochial educational institutions are operated in a
sectarian manner and are subject to church authority and, in the case
of other private educational institutions, that the same are subject to
private control and can select and choose those whom it wishes to re-
21. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
22. In the Bradfield decision, the Court held that the payment of money to a
hospital incorporated under an act of Congress, as compensation for the treat-
ment and cure of poor patients for whom the government was responsible, did
not contravene constitutional provisions against the establishment of religion.
The Court held that the mere fact that the members of the hospital corporation
were also members of a church and of a monastic order or sisterhood of the church,
did not render the contract between the hospital and the government for the pro-
vision of hospital services to "federal" patients unconstitutional. The Court par-
ticularly adverted to the fact that the hospital corporation as such did not con-
stitute a religious or sectarian body and that the services being rendered were in
no way sectarian or subject to sectarian influence. Thus, the Court concluded,
at 298-99,
It is simply the case of a secular corporation being managed by people who
hold to the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, but who nevertheless are
managing the corporation according to the law under which it exists. The
charter itself does not limit the exercise of its corporate powers to the mem-
bers of any particular religious denomination, but, on the contrary, those
powers are to be exercised in favor of anyone seeking the ministrations of
that kind of an institution .... As stated in the opinion of the court of ap-
peals, this corporation "is not declared the trustee of any church or religious
society. Its property is to be acquired in its own name and for its own pur-
poses; that property and its business are to be managed in its own way,
subject to no visitation, supervision, or control by any ecclessiastical au-
thority whatever but only to that of the government which created it. In
respect, then, of its creation, organization, management, and ownership of
property it is an ordinary private corporation whose rights are determinable
by the law of the land, and the religious opinions of whose members are not
subjects of inquiry." (Emphasis added.)
In Lien v. City of Ketchikan, 383 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1963), the court stressed
that under the lease involved, the Sisters of St. Joseph of Newark were required
to operate and maintain the hospital at their own expense and were proscribed
from denying admission or care because of race, color or creed and further were
required to establish only those rates and charges which were sufficient to pay for
the cost of operation. The court further noted that there was no showing that
anything in the arrangement between the City and the sectarian group would allow
for the provision of care and treatment in a sectarian context and concluded:
"The fact that specific sectarian beliefs may be entertained by those persons [that
is the members of the society] does not bar the city from achieving its valid
secular goal of caring for the sick." Id. at 724.
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ceive for enrollment, these courts, either implicitly or explicitly, have
held that the incidental benefits to the public arising out of the opera-
tion of such parochial and private educational institutions are not
within that category of public benefits and interests included within
the scope of "public purpose" so as to authorize resort to the power of
taxation.23 Thus, the fact that a particular expenditure may result in
the accrual of benefits to the public does not demonstrate the existence
of a "public purpose"; it is necessary, in order to constitutionally ap-
propriate and expend tax-raised funds, to demonstrate that the pur-
pose of the payment of such funds is to promote the general welfare
of all members of the public, either through the extension to them of
certain benefits or by the state's performance of functions and services
designed to accomplish matters of public concern.2 4
In rejecting the contention that the use of public monies for the
provision of educational aids and facilities to public school students is
violative of constitutional provisions interdicting the appropriation
and expenditure of tax-raised funds for the benefit of or to private in-
dividuals, state courts have found the authorization for such payments
in that public concern for the preservation and perpetuation of the
state's form of government and its institutions expressed in constitu-
tional provisions for the establishment and maintenance of a free
public educational system.25 This public concern for the universal
diffusion of education to the state's citizenry, stated and reflected in
23. See, e.g., People v. McAdams, 82 Ill. 356 (1876); Wright v. School Dist.
No. 27, 151 Kan. 485, 99 P.2d 737 (1940); Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. v. City of
Atchison, 47 Kan. 712, 28 Pac. 1000 (1892); Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94
(1869) ; State ex 'el. Public School Dist. v. Taylor, 122 Neb. 454, 240 N.W. 573
(1932); Curtis's Adm'r v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350 (1869).
24. See, e.g., Veterans' Welfare Bd. v. Riley, 189 Cal. 159, 208 Pac. 678 (1922)
(upholding provision to war veterans of free textbooks and transportation to the
school of their choice on the ground that services rendered in the armed forces
are "public services" within constitutional provisions authorizing expenditures
only for public purposes and proscribing use of such funds for private individuals
or purposes); Meredith v. Ray, 292 Ky. 326, 166 S.W.2d 437 (1942) (upholding
the provision of aid to dependent children); Bowman v. Frost, 158 S.W.2d 945
(Ky. 1942) (sustaining the validity of legislature providing aid to the needy
blind); see also, Commonwealth ex rel. Wehrle v. Plummer, 21 Pa. Dist. 182 (C.P.
1911), aff'd, 241 Pa. 224, 88 AtI. 481 (1913) (upholding the provision of public
school manual training facilities to parochial school students).
25. Pasadena City High School Dist., v. Upjohn, 206 Cal. 775, 276 Pac. 341
(1929) ; Macmillan Co. v. Clarke, 184 Cal. 491, 194 Pac. 1030 (1920) ; School Dist.
v. Atzenweiler, 67 Kan. 609, 73 Pac. 927 (1903); Dennis v. Wrigley, 175 Mich.
621, 141 N.W. 605 (1913) ; Bufkin v. Mitchell, 106 Miss. 253, 63 So. 458 (1913) ;
Affholder v. State, 51 Neb. 91, 70 N.W. 544 (1897); Berry v. School Bd., 78 N.H.
30, 95 Atl. 952 (1915) ; Fogg v. Board of Educ., 76 N.H. 296, 82 At. 173 (1912) ;
Seiler v. Gelhar, 54 N.D. 245, 209 N.W. 376 (1926) ; Cross v. Fisher, 132 Tenn. 31,
177 S.W. 43 (1915); Carey v. Thompson, 66 Vt. 665, 30 Atl. 5 (1894); Bagel v.
School Dist. No. 1, 184 Wis. 251, 199 N.W. 67 (1924).
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the introductory declarations of various state constitutional provisions
for public school systems,2r has been found to furnish that public pur-
pose necessary to the constitutional utilization of public funds; in thus
positing the existence of a public purpose, the courts have found in it
authorization for the appropriation and expenditure of tax-raised
funds in order to assure the existence of an efficient system of free
public education. 27 Thus, unless there exist express constitutional
limitations in this area, the public interest in and the public purpose
underlying the public educational process furnish the constitutional'
authorization for the use of public monies in furnishing those ends,
means and appliances necessary or useful to the effective operation of
that educational process. 28 These decisions all reflect the fact that the
26. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) provides, in part, as follows:
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the
preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the general assembly
shall establish and maintain free public schools for the gratuitous instruction
of all persons in this state within ages not in excess of twenty-one years as
prescribed by law.
See, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND or COLUABIA UNIVESITY, op. cit.
supra note 13, at 369-70, 374; LANoUE, op. cit. supra note 11 at 12-14; CUBBERLY,
PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 113 (1919).
27. Pasadena City High School Dist. v. Upjohn, 206 Cal. 775, 276 Pac. 341
(1929) ; Macmillan Co. v. Clarke, 184 Cal. 491, 194 Pac. 1030 (1920) ; In re Kinder-
garten Schools, 18 Colo. 234, 32 Pac. 422 (1893); Williams v. Board of Pub. In-
struction, 133 Fla. 624, 182 So. 837 (1938) ; Board of Pub. Instruction v. Kennedy,
109 Fla. 153, 147 So. 250 (1933); Malounek v. Highfll, 100 Fla. 1428, 131 So.
313 (1930); Fitzpatrick v. Johnson, 174 Ga. 746, 163 S.E. 908 (1932); School
City of Marrion v. Forrest, 168 Ind. 94, 78 N.E. 187 (1906); Bruggeman v. In-
dependent School Dist. No. 4, 227 Iowa 661, 289 N.W. 5 (1939) ; Lamphier v. Tracy
Consol. School Dist., 224 Iowa 1035, 277 N.W. 740 (1938); Dermit v. Sergeant
Bluff Consol. Independent School Dist., 220 Iowa 344, 261 N.W. 636 (1935);
Williams v. Board of Trustees, 173 Ky. 708, 191 S.W. 507 (1917); Bathgen v.
Reorganized School Dist., 365 Mo. 518, 284 S.W.2d 516 (1955); State e otel.
Clark v. Gordon, 261 Mo. 631, 170 S.W. 892 (1914); State e otel. Lien v.
School Dist. No. 73, 106 Mont. 223, 76 P.2d 330 (1938); McBride v. Reardon,
105 Mont. 96, 69 P.2d 975 (1937); Affholder v. State, 51 Neb. 91, 70 N.W.
544 (1897) ; People ex rel. Board of Educ. v. Graves, 243 N.Y. 204, 153 N.E. 49
(1926), reversing 215 App. Div. 744, 213 N.Y. Supp. 767 (1925); Rhynehart v.
Spaulding, 137 Misc. 820, 244 N.Y. Supp. 569 (Sup. Ct. 1930), aff'd, 232 App.
Div. 785, 249 N.Y. Supp. 897 (1931); Rysdam v. School Dist. No. 67, 154 Ore.
347, 58 P.2d 614 (1936); Cross v. Fisher, 132 Tenn. 31, 177 S.W. 43 (1915);
McGee v. Franklin Pub. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 216, 39 S.W. 335 (1897) ; Beard v.
Board of Educ., 81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900 (1932).
28. Compare Macmillan Co. v. Clarke, 184 Cal. 491, 194 Pac. 1030 (1920)
(upholding provision of free textbooks to public" high school students); In re
Kindergarten Schools, supra note 27 (upholding legislation for the establishment
of kindergarten facilities for children under six years of age); School City of
Marrion v. Forrest, supra note 27 (sustaining legislation providing for the estab-
lisbient and maintenance of free public libraries) with Knowlton v. Baumhover,
182 Iowa 691, 166 N.W. 202 (1918) (notwithstanding the fact that greater educa-
tional advantages and other benefits were afforded to pupils of public school, the
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free public school system is not primarily a service to the individual
pupil enrolled in it but a service to the state and community in pro-
viding that general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence necessary
and essential to the preservation and perpetuation of government, its
institutions, and the rights and liberties of the people. Thus, expendi-
tures designed to make the public educational process more effectual
and pervasive are constitutionally analogous to the appropriation and
expenditure of tax-raised funds for fire and police protection and the
numerous other public service utilities which, provided for and main-
tained by taxation and ministering to individual needs, are premised
upon and designed for the benefit of the general public.
The utilization of the state's power and public monies in furtherance
of that public purpose and function effected by the general diffusion
of knowledge and intelligence and reflected in the constitutional man-
date providing for the free public education of the youth of the state
in order to assure the same, is reflected in the historical circumstances
surrounding the closing of the many small public district schools and
the merger of their combined pupils into consolidated public schools
in order to assure and provide for efficient educational facilities.29 As
contract or arrangement between the public school and the parochial school pro-
viding for common use of physical facilities was contrary to public policy and
therefore invalid); Williams v. Board of Trustees, supra note 27 (semble).
29. See, Hendrix v. Morris, 127 Ark. 222, 191 S.W. 949 (1917); Board of Pub.
Instruction v. Kennedy, 109 Fla. 153, 147 So. 250 (1933); Malounek v. Highiill,
100 Fla. 1428, 131 So. 313 (1930); Board of Educ. v. Hunt, 159 Ga. 749, 126
S.E. 789 (1925); Silver Lake Consol. School Dist. v. Parker, 238 Iowa 984, 29
N.W.2d 214 (1947); Lanphier v. Tracy Consol. School Dist., 224 Iowa 1035, 277
N.W. 740 (1938); Ex parts County Bd. of Educ., 260 Ky. 246, 84 S.W.2d 59
(1935); County Bd. of Educ. v. Goodpaster, 260 Ky. 198, 84 S.W.2d 59 (1935);
Eastham v. Greenup County Bd. of Educ., 247 Ky. 16, 56 S.W.2d 550 <1933);
Audas v. Logan County Bd. of Educ., 246 Ky. 534, 55 S.W.2d 341 (1932); Knox
County Bd. of Educ. v. Fultz, 241 Ky. 265, 43 S.W.2d 707 (1931); Byrne v.
Caldwell, 227 Ky. 59, 11 S.W.2d 1004 (1928); Gragg v. County Bd. of
Educ., 200 Ky. 53, 252 S.W. 137 (1923); Gibson v. Anderson, 170 Ky. 664, 186
S.W. 497 (1916); Dennis v. Wrigley, 175 Mich. 621, 141 N.W. 605 (1913); Bufkin
v. Mitchell, 106 Miss. 253, 63 So. 458 (1913); State ex rel. Clark v. Gordon, 261
Mo. 631, 170 S.W. 892 (1914); Berry v. School Bd., 78 N.H. 30, 95 Atl. 952
(1915); Fogg v. Board of Educ., 76 N.H. 296, 82 Atl. 173 (1912); People ex rel.
Board of Educ. v. Graves, 243 N.Y. 204, 153 N.E. 49 (1926), reversing 215 App.
Div. 744, 213 N.Y. Supp. 767 (1925); Rhynehart v. Spaulding, 137 Misc. 820, 244
N.Y. Supp. 569 (Sup. Ct. 1930), affd, 232 App. Div. 785, 249 N.Y. Supp. 897
(1931) ; Seiler v. Gelhar, 54 N.D. 245, 209 N.W. 376 (1926) ; Eastgate v. Osago
School Dist., 41 N.D. 518, 171 N.W. 96 (1919) ; State ex rel. Brand v. Mostad, 28
N.D. 244, 148 N.W. 831 (1914) ; Commissioner ex rel. Mellot v. Belfast Township
School Dist., 30 Pa. Dist. 430 (C.P. 1920); Jones v. Clifford Township School
Directors, 41 Pa. County Ct. 387 (C.P. 1913), aff'd, 61 Pa. Super. 73 (1915);
Cross v. Fisher, 132 Tenn. 31, 177 S.W. 43 (1915); Proctor v. Hufnail, 111 Vt.
365, 16 A.2d 518 (1940) ; Carey v. Thompson, 66 Vt. 665, 30 Atl. 5 (1894) ; Visser
v. Nooksack Valley School Dist. No. 506, 207 P.2d 198 (Wash. 1949); Hein v.
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a consequence of such consolidation, many pupils of the former district
schools were inconvenienced in that the consolidated schools, being
located in centralized areas, were less accessible and, in order to enable
those pupils more substantially affected by the increase in distance to
school consequent upon consolidation to obtain that general diffusion
of knowledge and intelligence embodied in the provision for a public
educational process, the provision of transportation to them became a
necessity30 Decisions in this area reflect the fact that the public pur-
Luther, 197 Wis. 88, 221 N.W. 386 (1928) ; Pagel v. School Dist. No. 1, 184 Wis.
251, 199 N.W. 67 (1924) ;See also, Tow v. Dunbar Consol. School Dist., 200 Iowa
1254, 206 N.W. 94 (1925); Board of Educ. v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 Atl. 628
(Ct. App. 1938).
30. See Shores v. Elmore County Ed. of Educ., 241 Ala. 464, 3 So.2d 14 (1941);
Scott v. Mattingly, 236 Ala. 254, 182 So. 24 (1938); Hendrix v. Morris, supra
note 29; Snyder v. Town of Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal
dismissed, 365 U.S. 299 (1961) ; Reaves v. Sadler, 136 Fla. 553, 189 So. 41 (1939) ;
Williams v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 133 Fla. 624, 182 So. 837 (1938); Keever
v. Board of Educ., 188 Ga. 299, 3 S.E.2d 886 (1939); Douglas v. Board of Educ.,
164 Ga. 271, 138 S.E. 226 (1927) ; Board of Educ. v. Hunt, supra note 29; Jackson
School Township v. State ex Tel. Garrison, 204 Ind. 251, 183 N.E. 657 (1932);
Lyle v. State ea rel. Smith, 172 Ind. 502, 88 N.E. 850 (1909) ; State ex 'el. Beard
v. Jackson, 168 Ind. 384, 81 N.E. 62 (1907); Nelson v. State ex Tel. Martin, 168
Ind. 491, 81 N.E. 486 (1907) ; State ex Tel. Cook v. Widolff, 91 Ind. App. 86, 167
N.E. 633 (1929); Riecks v. Independent School Dist., 219 Iowa 101, 257 N.W. 546
(1934); Queeney v. Higgins, 136 Iowa 573, 114 N.W. 51 (1907); Schumaker V.
School Dist. No. 141, 137 Kan. 844, 22 P.2d 441 (1933) ; Hildebrand v. School Dist.
No. 59, 136 Kan. 311, 15 P.2d 412 (1932); Woelk v. Consolidated School Dist.,
133 Kan. 346, 299 Pac. 648 (1931); Purkeypyle v. School Dist. No. 101, 127 Kan.
751, 275 Pac. 146 (1929) ; Park v. McKinney, 121 Kan. 41, 245 Pac. 1021 (1926) ;
Harkness v. School Ed., 103 Kan. 573, 175 Pac. 386 (1918); Hines v. Pulaski
County Ed. of Educ., 292 Ky. 100, 166 S.W.2d 37 (Ct. App. 1942); Byrne v.
Caldwell, supra note 29; Adams v. County Comm'rs, 180 Md. 550, 26 A.2d 377
(Ct. App. 1942) ; Wilson v. Brouder, 291 Mass. 389, 197 N.E. 26 (1935) ; Perszyk
v. School Dist. No. 32, 212 Minn. 513, 4 N.W.2d 321 (1942); Bufkin v. Mitchell,
supra note 29; State ex rel. Rice v. Tompkins, 239 Mo. App. 1113, 203 S.W.2d
881 (1947); State ex Tel. Gastineau v. Smith, 196 S.W. 115 (Mo. Ct. App. 1917);
State ex 'el. Robinson v. Desonia, 67 Mont. 201, 215 Pac. 220 (1923) ; Peterson v.
School Dist. No. 68, 124 Neb. 352, 246 N.W. 723 (1933); Berry v. School Ed.,
supra note 29; Fogg v. Board of Educ., supra note 29; McKnight v. Cassady,
113 N.J.L. 565, 174 Atl. 865 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934); Board of Educ. v. Atwood,
73 N.J.L. 315, 62 Atl. 1130 (1906), aff'd, 74 N.J.L. 638, 65 Atl. 999 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1907) ; People ex 'el. Ed. of Educ. v. Graves, supra note 29; Seiler v. Gelhar,
supra note 29; Patton v. State, 14 Ohio Ct. App. 64 (1919); Consolidated School
Dist. v. Union Graded School Dist., 185 Okla. 485, 94 P.2d 549 (1939); Reynolds
v. Tankersley, 167 Okla. 425, 29 P.2d 976 (1934); Commissioner ex rtel. Mellot v.
Belfast Township School Dist., supra note 29; Jones v. Clifford Township School
Directors, supra note 29; Commissioner ex 'el. Houck v. Ferguson Township
School Dist. 22 Pa. Dist. 592 (C.P. 1912); Commissioner v. Ferguson Township
School Dist., 40 Pa. County Ct. 470 (C.P. 1912); Bacon v. Delmar Township
School Directors, 16 Pa. Dist. 495 (1906); In re Lawrence Township School Direc-
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pose and function contained in and underlying the constitutionality
of the provision of transportation is that of effectuating the operation
of the public educational process by making it available to those who
without such transportation could not obtain it or would be seriously
impaired in their ability to obtain it ;31 these decisions, either implicitly
or explicitly, are grounded upon the recognition that the provision of
transportation to public school students is constitutionally defensible
as an administrative provision of the public educational system and a
cost of the maintenance thereof. 2 Certain of the decisions in this area
tors, 32 Pa. County Ct. 665 (1906) ; Commissioner ex rel. Davis v. Girard Town-
ship School Directors, 15 Pa. Dist. 731 (C.P. 1905); Derichs v. Lake Creek
School Dist., 57 S.D. 586, 234 N.W. 527 (1931); Cross v. Fisher, supra note 29;
Town School Dist. v. Dempsey, 103 Vt. 481, 156 Atl. 387 (1931) ; Visser v. Nook-
sack Valley School Dist. No. 506, suprus note 29; Hein v. Luther, supra note 29.
31. See, e.g., Gould Special School Dist. v. Holdtorff, 171 Ark. 668, 285 S.W. 357
(1926); Pasadena City High School Dist. v. Upjohn, 206 Cal. 775, 276 Pac. 341
(1929); Silver Lake Consol. School Dist. v. Parker, 238 Iowa 984, 29 N.W.2d 214
(1947) ; Schmidt v. Blair, 203 Iowa 1016, 213 N.W. 593 (1927) ; Gordon v. Wooten,
168 Miss. 717, 152 So. 481 (1934); Bufkin v. Mitchell, 106 Miss. 253, 63 So. 458
(1913); State ex rel. Rice v. Tompkins, supra note 30; State ex rel. Gastineau v.
Smith, yupra note 30; Morfield v. Huddin, 131 Neb. 180, 267 N.W. 350 (1936);
Fogg v. Board of Educ., 76 N.H. 296, 82 Atl. 173 (1912); People ex Tel. Bd. of
Educ. v. Graves, 243 N.Y. 204, 153 N.E. 49 (1926) ; reversing 215 App. Div. 744,
213 N.Y. Supp. 767 (1925) ; Hayes v. Benton, 193 N.C. 379, 137 S.E. 169 (1927) ;
Board of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 126 Ohio St. 575, 186 N.E. 456 (1933); Board
of Educ. v. Cox, 117 Ohio St. 406, 159 N.E. 479 (1927); Sommers v. Board of
Educ., 113 Ohio St. 177, 148 N.E. 682 (1925); State ex rel. Keller v. Board of
Educ., 11 Ohio Ct. App. 298 (1918); Carey v. Thompson, 66 Vt. 665, 30 Atl. 5
(1894) ; Gale v. School Dist. No. 4, 49 Wyo. 384, 54 P.2d 811 (1936).
32. Pasadena City High School Dist. v. Upjohn, supra note 31; Board of Pub.
Instruction v. Kennedy, 109 Fla. 153, 147 So. 250 (1933); Malounek v. Highfill,
100 Fla. 1428, 131 So. 313 (1930) ; Fitzpatrick v. Johnson, 174 Ga. 746, 163 S.E.
908 (1932) ; Silver Lake Consol. School Dist. v. Parker, supra note 31; Bruggeman
v. Independent School Dist. No. 4, 227 Iowa 661, 289 N.W. 5 (1939); Lanphier v.
Tracy Consol. School Dist., 224 Iowa 1035, 277 N.W. 740 (1938); Dermit v.
Sergeant Bluff Consol. Independent School Dist., 220 Iowa 344, 261 N.W. 636
(1935) ; School Dist. v. Atzenweiler, 67 Kan. 609, 73 Pac. 927 (1903) ; Squires v.
Inhabitants of City of Augusta, 153 A.2d 80, 85 (Me. 1959); State exr el. Kleimek
v. School Dist. No. 70, 204 Minn. 279, 283 N.W. 397 (1939); Bufkin v. Mitchell,
supra note 31; State ex rel. Lien v. School Dist. No. 73, 106 Mont. 223, 76 P.2d
330 (1938) ; McBride v. Reardon, 105 Mont. 96, 69 P.2d 975 (1937) ; People ex rel.
Bd. of Educ. v. Graves, supra note 31; Rhynehart v. Spaulding, 137 Misc. 820,
244 N.Y. Supp. 569 (Sup. Ct. 1930), aff'd, 232 App. Div. 785, 249 N.Y. Supp. 897
(1931); Rysdam v. School Dist. No. 67, 154 Ore. 347, 58 P.2d 614 (1936); Haas
v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 69 S.D. 303, 9 N.W.2d 707 (1943); Cross v.
Fisher, 132 Tenn. 31, 177 S.W. 43 (1915) ; Beard v. Board of Educ., 81 Utah 51, 16
P.2d 900 (1932). See In re West Fallowfield School Dist., 29 Pa. County Ct. 600
(C.P. 1904) ; Dahl v. Independent School Dist. No. 2, 45 S.D. 366, 187 N.W. 638
(1922); see also Raybern Bus Service, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 430, 431 (1960) (dis-
missal of representation petition on ground that employer-transit company, en-
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have further held,33 and others have incidentally determined,8'" that
the provision of transportation to school pupils is constitutionally sup-
portable on the ground that such transportation involves the use of
public funds for the benefit of private persons only because such
transportation is a component part of the public educational process,
constituting the implementation and exercise of that governmental
function and public purpose embodied in the public school system.
In furtherance of that public purpose and function inherent in and
obtaining from the diffusion of knowledge and intelligence, state legis-
latures, in compliance with constitutional mandates therefor, have
established and maintained public educational systems and as a com-
ponent part of such educational process have appropriated and ex-
pended public monies for the provision of transportation on this basis,
the furnishing of publicly-financed transportation to those public
school pupils in need of the same has withstood the objection that the
provision of such transportation results in a private benefit to the
recipients thereof and thus contravenes constitutional proscriptions
against the appropriation and expenditure of public monies to, or for
the benefit of, private individuals and institutions. When a child is
placed in a private or parochial school, he is withdrawn from the pub-
lic educational process embodied in the system of public schools pro-
vided by the state and becomes a part of a private educational process;
in the provision of publicly-financed transportation for such a child,
whether the same is viewed as a benefit to the private or parochial
school involved or as a benefit to the child only, that public purpose
supporting the constitutionality of furnishing transportation to public
school students is not present and, it is submitted, that there then
exists no constitutional defense against the contention that the pro-
gaged primarily in transporting school children, was not transit enterprise within
Board's jurisdiction since engaged "primarily in aid of the State in the field of
education").
33. Bufkin v. Mitchell, 106 Miss. 253, 63 So. 458 (1913); Gurney v. Ferguson,
122 P.2d 1002 (Okla. 1941), appeal dismissed, 317 U.S. 588 (1942); Consolidated
School Dist., No. I v. Wright, 261 Pac. 933 (Okla. 1927); Cross v. Fisher, supra
note 32; Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 201, 135 P.2d 79 (Wash. 1943).
34. See Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), appeal dismissed,
368 U.S. 517 (1962); Silver Lake Consol. School Dist. v. Parker, 238 Iowa 984,
29 N.W.2d 214 (1947); School Dist. v. Atzenweiler, 67 Kan. 609, 73 Pac. 927
(1903); Sherrard v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963
(Ct. App. 1942); Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951); Haas v.
Independent School Dist. No. 1, 69 S.D. 303, 9 N.W.2d 707 (1943); Visser v.
Nooksack Valley School Dist. No. 506, 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949);
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962) ; State
ex rel. Van Stratten v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192 N.W. 392 (1923).
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vision of such transportation results in the use of public monies for
private purposes or for the benefit of private individuals. 5
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS UPON THE
USE OF "EDUCATIONAL FUNDS"
That the provision of publicly-financed transportation to public
school students constitutes an expenditure for educational purposes
within the function of the state, and not primarily for the benefit of
the individual recipients of such transportation, is reflected in those
decisions upholding the use of funds constitutionally restricted to the
maintenance and support of the state's free public schools as a source
for the provision of such transportation.3 6 These decisions, as well as
those dealing with the provision of other aids and facilities to public
school students,3 7 demonstrate that the purpose and intendment of
constitutional provisions, similar to those in Missouri,38 securing the
"inviolability" of public school funds against use for any purpose
other than one consonant with the state's duty to provide a free public
educational system, are two-fold: that is, to provide and maintain a
permanent fund secure against change, reduction or legislative incur-
sion and, equally important, to constitute a complete barrier against
the diversion of educational funds to private and parochial schools and
educational institutions, without impeding or limiting the power of the
legislature to furnish through general legislation those facilities, aids
and appurtenances necessary for and in aid of the public educational
35. See, e.g., Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941), appeal
dismissed, 317 U.S. 588 (1942); Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 201,
17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943).
36. See Board of Pub. Instruction v. Kennedy, 109 Fla. 153, 147 So. 250 (1933);
Malounek v. Highfill, 100 Fla. 1428, 131 So. 313 (1930); Fitzpatrick v. Johnson,
174 Ga. 746, 163 S.E. 908 (1932); Dermit v. Sergeant Bluff Consol. Independent
School Dist., 220 Iowa 344, 261 N.W. 636 (1935); Byrne v. Caldwell, 227 Ky. 59,
11 S.W. 2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1928); Dennis v. Wrigley, 175 Mich. 621, 141 N.W. 605
(1913) ; Bufkin v. Mitchell, 106 Miss. 253, 63 So. 458 (1913) ; State ex Tel. Lien v.
School Dist. No. 73, 106 Mont. 223, 76 P.2d 330 (1938) ; McBride v. Reardon, 105
Mont. 96, 69 P.2d 975 (1937); Berry v. School Bd., 78 N.H. 30, 95 Atl. 952 (1915);
Fogg v. Board of Educ., 76 N.H. 296, 82 Atl. 173 (1912); Cross v. Fisher, 132
Tenn. 31, 177 S.W. 43 (1915) ; Beard v. Board of Educ., 81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900
(1932) ; Carey v. Thompson, 66 Vt. 665, 30 Atl. 5 (1894).
37. See Macmillan Co. v. Clarke, 184 Cal. 491, 194 Pac. 1030 (1920) ; Knowlton
v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 166 N.W. 202 (1918) ; Williams v. Board of Trustees,
173 Ky. 708, 191 S.W. 507 (1917); Bathgen v. Reorganized School Dist., 365 Mo.
518, 284 S.W.2d 516 (1955); Affholder v. State, 51 Neb. 91, 70 N.W. 544 (1897).
38. Mo. CONsT. art. IX, §§ 3, 5. See LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND or
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 385-87 (2d ed.
1959).
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process.39 These decisions, and others, 40 have concluded that the net
effect of constitutional provisions assuring a permanent "school fund"
and proscribing the use of public school funds for any purpose other
than the support and maintenance of the public school system, is to
prohibit the use of any funds appropriated for educational purposes,
whether drawn from the permanent school fund or from general
revenue for purposes other than the public educational system and to
interdict against the diversion of such educational funds to private or
parochial schools,41 notwithstanding the fact that in some instances
payment from such funds to privately owned and operated educational
institutions may result in benefits to public school students.42 The de-
cisions in this area demonstrate that the cumulative effect of constitu-
tional provisions providing for, and restricting the use of, "educational
funds" is to assure the facilitation of the public educational process
and to incorporate into and apply to that process the principle of sep-
aration of church and state; upon this basis, courts have invalidated
the provision of transportation to parochial school students, holding
that a transportation fund, whether appropriated from the permanent
"school fund" or from general revenue, constitutes the appropriation
of public money for educational purposes within the constitutional
proscription against the diversion of educational funds to private or
parochial schools.43
39. See Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 166 N.W. 202 (1918); Wright
v. School Dist. No. 27, 151 Kan. 485, 99 P.2d 737 (1940); Sherrard v. Jefferson
County Ed. of Educ., 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963 (1942); Williams v.
Board of Trustees, 173 Ky. 708, 191 S.W. 507 (1917); Opinion Of The Justices,
214 Mass. 599, 102 N.E. 464 (1913); Bufkin v. Mitchell, 106 Miss. 253, 63 So.
458 (1913); Otken v. Lamkin, 56 Miss. 758 (1879); State ex Tel. Pub. School
Dist. v. Taylor, 122 Neb. 454, 240 N.W. 573 (1932) ; Rutgers College v. Morgan,
70 N.J.L. 460, 57 Atl. 250 (Sup. Ct. 1904), aff'd, 71 N.J.L. 663, 60 Atl. 205 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1905) ; Jernigan v. Finley, 90 Tex. 205, 38 S.W. 24 (1896) ; Carey v.
Thompson, 66 Vt. 665, 30 Atl. 5 (1894).
40. State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 Atl. 835 (Super. Ct. 1934),
writ of error dismissed on other grounds, 39 Del. 187, 197 Atl. 478 (1938) ; Zellers
v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951); Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200,
15 N.E.2d 576 (1938); Synod of Dakota v. State, 2 S.D. 366, 50 N.W. 632 (1891).
41. Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), appeal dismissed, 368
U.S. 517 (1962) ; State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, supra note 40; Knowlton v. Baum-
hover, 182 Iowa 691, 166 N.W. 202 (1918); Sherrard v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ. 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963 (Ct. App. 1942); Williams v. Board of Trus-
tees, 173 Ky. 708, 191 S.W. 507 (1917) ; Opinion Of The Justices, 214 Mass. 599,
102 N.E. 464 (1913); Judd v. Board of Educ., supra note 40; State ex rel. Weiss
v. District Ed., 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890).
42. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Baumhover, supra note 41; Williams v. Board of
Trustees, supra note 41; Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951); Synod
of Dakota v. State, 2 S.D. 366, 50 N.W. 632 (1891).
43. See State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 Atl. 835 (Super. Ct.
1934), writ of error dismissed on other grounds, 39 Del. 187, 197 Atl. 478 (1938) ;
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The need for a free public school system was not universally recog-
nized throughout the United States until the middle of the 19th cen-
tury,4 and the provision of a public educational process is reflected
in constitutional provisions relating to the same; thus, it has been
stated,4 that the movement toward the establishment and maintenance
of the public educational process caused the necessity for constitutional
amendments and revisions, increasingly detailed in nature, in order
to specifically apply that principle of the separation of church and
state, already extant with regard to governmental matters, to educa-
tion. That this is the case is reflected in the historical development of
constitutional amendments and revisions in Missouri.46 The constitu-
tion of 1865 contained provisions setting aside a special "school fund"
and restricting the use of that fund and the income thereof to the
support and maintenance of the free public schools only;47 those pro-
visions enunciating the principle of separation of church and state in
governmental matters contained in the prior constitution,R which
incidentally contained no provision for the public schools, were gen-
erally rephrased and reiterated.'4 It was the purpose of such first
"inviolability" provisions to assure the existence of a permanent
source of support for the free public schools safeguarded against
legislative trespass or incursion for any other purpose whatever and
such provisions were apparently included with the thought that the
only public monies available for the support of the free public educa-
tional process would be derived from this constitutionally protected
fund.50 The subsequent realization that those funds necessary for the
support and maintenance of public schools and the effectual facilita-
tion of the public educational process could not be supplied from the
Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938); see also, Sherrard
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963 (Ct. App. 1942);
Haas v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 69 S.D. 303, 9 N.W.2d 707 (1943).
44. See 1 C. & M. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIvILIzATION 809-18 (1927);
CUBBERLEY, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 118-19 (1919); LA NOUE,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 12-14; MOEHLMAN, THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE 132-35 (1951).
45. La Noue, op. cit. supra note 11, at 13.
46. For an excellent treatment of constitutional developments in Missouri, see
THE STATE HISTORICAL SOC'Y OF MO., JOURNAL, MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION oF 1875 (2 vols., 1921).
47. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § V (1865).
48. Mo. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 4, 5 (1820).
49. Mo. CONST. art. I, §§ X, XI (1865).
50. See Vols. 1 and 2 THE STATE HISTORICAL SoO'y OF Mo., op. cit. supra note
46, at 187, 207, 526, 586-88 and 717; see Bathgen v. Reorganized School Dist., 365
Mo. 518, 284 S.W.2d 516 (1955); Lincoln Univ. v. Hackmann, 295 Mo. 118,
243 S.W. 320 (1922); see also, Kintzele v. City of St. Louis, 347 S.W.2d 695 (Mo.
1961); Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo.
1959).
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permanent school fund resulted in the necessity of recourse to the
state's general revenues derived from its powers of taxation.51 Also,
in order to give to those educational funds drawn from the general
revenue that constitutional protection afforded by the limitations upon
the permanent school fund, constitutional provisions setting forth the
principle of separation of church and state in governmental matters
were added to and included within the article dealing with education.52
51. The decision in Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), appeal
dismissed, 368 U.S. 517 (1962), is much in point with regard to the historical
perspective surrounding the development toward the appropriation of tax-raised
funds for educational purposes from general revenues. In that case, the court
had occasion to consider the validity of a statute authorizing transportation of
parochial school pupils on the same terms and conditions as those upon which
conveyance was afforded to public school students in connection with the funda-
mental law in the Territory of Alaska prior to statehood (48 U.S.C. § 21-486).
In considering the proscriptions of that provision inhibiting the use of "any public
money" for the support or benefit of any sectarian or denominational school or
any school not under the exclusive control of the government, the court pointed
out that Alaska's provision with regard to the educational field was enacted in a
modern context at a time when it was clear that a special fund and the income
therefrom could not provide sufficient monies for the support of the free public
schools and, therefore, that there was no distinction between general funds and
funds for the support of the free public schools, the proscription being directed
against the use of "any public money." Thus, the court concluded that Alaska's
basic law contained in one provision that which is necessarily extant in one or
more constitutional provisions in other state constitutions, that is, an interdiction
against the use of any public funds, appropriated for educational purposes, to aid,
benefit or support any school system or school other than that system and those
schools which it is the state's constitutional duty to maintain and support.
52. See Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 8 and the constitutional predecessor thereof Mo.
CONST. art. XI, § 11 (1875). The debates at the constitutional convention, 1943-44,
are of particular significance in this regard (page references used hereinafter in
this footnote are to the pages of the typewritten debates of the constitutional
convention of 1943-44 which are the property of the Law Library Association of
St. Louis). During the debates, a proposal that the sections dealing with the
separation of church and state (Mo. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 6, 7) be combined into one
section was discussed; after lengthy debate regarding phraseology and the fact
that certain difficulties could arise from such a combination (pp. 1502-06), the
following was pointed out:
MR. DAMRON: Mr. President and Members of the Convention, the sub-
stitute section to restore Sections 6 and 7 of the present Constitution. Mr.
Kehr and I appointed on a sub-committee of the Bill of Rights Committee to
consider Sections 5 to 20, I believe at least Sections 7 and 8, were a part of
the Article referred to us. The first part of Section 7 of the present Con-
stitution provides that no money shall be taken from the public treasury,
directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion
or in aid of any priest, minister, preacher or teacher thereof as such. Now
there is a similar section in the article on Education. Page 92, this Con-
stitution of Missouri, Section 11, says "neither the General Assembly nor
any county, city, town, township, school district or other municipal corpora-
tion, shall ever make an appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever,
anything in the aid of any religious creed, church or sectarian purpose,'d so forth. Mr. Kehr and I, when we reported to our Committee, sug-
gested that the first clause of Section 7 of the Bill of Rights be referred to
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This purposeful incorporation into and application of the principle of
the separation of church and state in the area of education, contained
in article IX, section 8 of the present constitution53 is strong support
the Education Committee that we might consider combining, putting Section
11 under the article of Education and the first part of Section 7 in the
Bill of Rights since they both restricted against the use of public money
to aid any school, church or anything of that kind. The Education Com-
mittee did not accept the suggestion and referred the matter back to the
Bill of Rights Committee and, so the report came in in the form that Mr.
Marr has submitted. They're seeking to combine those two sections, 7 and 8.
Now, those two sections deal with different subjects. Section 7 restricts
against the taking of money from the public treasury, directly or indirectly
in aid of any church, sect, denomination of religion and so forth. Whereas,
Section 6, directed to the protection of the rights of individuals, says, 'no
person can be compelled to erect, support or attend any place or system of
worship or to maintain or support any priest, minister, teacher,' and so forth.
Section 6 protects the rights of individuals. Section 7 is designed to protect
public monies against being used for religious purposes. Now, I think the
two sections, the two old sections ought to be restored in the Constitution
because they are very important sections, 7 especially, I think is very impor-
tant because it is the one that protects (against) the misuse of public funds
for religious purposes. Id. at 1506. (Emphasis added.)
After a further discussion, the sections referred to above were adopted as separate
provisions rather than in the combined form initially proposed (pp. 1506-07).
Subsequently, during the discussion on provisions for inclusion in the article on
education, there was an occasion for the convention to deal with that provision
proscribing the use of public funds for religious purposes which is parallel with
the section 7 referred to in the above discussion, that is, section 8 to which Mr.
Damron referred; that provision is included in the present article on education
(Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 8). There was a general discussion with regard to the
fact that the proposed section (based on Mo. CONST. art. XI, § 11 (1875)) was
parallel with that contained in the Bill of Rights precluding the use of public
money, "directly or indirectly," in aid of any church, sect or denomination of
religion (pp. 2426-28) and in this connection, the following was pointed out:
MR. PHILIPS (of St. Louis City): I notice, Mr. Lindsay, that this Section
contains a great many of the provisions that were adopted by this
Convention in the File on the Bill of Rights . . .
MR. LINDSAY: Well, the Bill of Rights section pertains generally to the
expenditure of funds for religious purposes. This pertains to schools.
MR. PHILIPS (of St. Louis City): Do you think it ought to be in this File
as well as in the Bill of Rights?
MR. LINDSAY: Yes, the Committee discussed the Bill of Rights and felt
that this should be in this article. (Emphasis added.)
53. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 8 provides:
Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school
district or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation or
pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any religious creed,
church or sectarian purpose, or to help to support or sustain any private
public school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other institution of
learning controlled by any religious creed, church or sectarian denomination
whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of personal property or real estate
ever be made by the state, or any county, city, town, or other municipal
corporation, for any religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose whatever.
(Emphasis added.)
Compare the above with the provisions of Mo. CONST. art. I, § 7, which states:
That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid
of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no
preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any church,
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
for the conclusion that any public funds appropriated for educational
purposes, whether the same be drawn from the permanent school
fund-' or from general revenues, are constitutionally limited to the
support and maintenance of the free public school system and circum-
scribed by proscriptions against the diversion thereof for any purpose
other than the facilitation and effectuation of the public educational
process.55
sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship. (Em-
phasis added.)
54. MO. CONST. art. IX, §§ 3, 5.
55. The few decisions in Missouri dealing with this general area have held
that Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 8 has a separate and distinct meaning and that the
intendment of it is to establish the absolute separation of church and state in the
educational area similar to that separation enjoined and declared in the Bill of
Rights, Mo. CONST. art. I, § 7. Thus, in Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163
S.W.2d 609 (1941), the court referred to the constitutional predecessor of the
present article IX, Section 8 and held that that provision precluded a school district
from making payments from any public fund to sustain any private or public
school controlled by any sectarian denomination and therefore, that when the
school district in question utilized public funds to help support a school influenced
by sectarian interests it violated that constitutional proscription. The court further
indicated that this constitutional precursor of the present article IX, Section 8 re-
lated specifically to the educational area and was separate and distinct from that
provision contained in Mo. CONST. art II, § 7 (article I, § 7 of the present constitu-
tion) prohibiting the use of any money from the public treasury, directly or in-
directly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion. The court con-
cluded that the constitutional policy of the State of Missouri decreed the absolute
separation of church and state, not only in governmental matters, but in educa-
tional ones as well and that any public money coming from taxpayers of every de-
nomination, cannot be used for the aid or support or the help of any religious sect
in education or otherwise. That the import and intendment of article IX, Section 8
were to assure the separation of church and state in educational matters was
reaffirmed in the decision in Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8, 364 Mo.
121, 260 S.W.2d 573 (1953). In that case, the court enjoined the defendant school
board from contributing to the maintenance and operation of a school in which
it was found that certain sectarian interests had gained control. The court held
that the presence of such sectarian features destroyed the free public character of
the school in question thus rendering it ineligible for support from public funds
or by public authority; the court's injunction precluded the use of any public
fund or money for such purpose. The decision turned upon a construction of Mo.
CONST. art. I, §§ 5-7 (providing for the exercise of freedom of religion and pro-
scribing the establishment of any church or sect) and the provisions of Mo. CoNsT.
art. IX, § 8. In connection with this construction and the interrelationship of
these provisions, the court concluded that the State of Missouri had expressed
herein its definite policy to maintain free public schools and a public school
system separate and apart from all religious or sectarian activities in order to
assure absolute freedom of religion. This court, in construing the relation of
article IX, Section 8 with that established policy, held that no public funds or
properties, either directly or indirectly, could be used to support or sustain any
school affected by religious influences or teachings or conducted in such a manner
as to influence or predispose a school child to the acceptance of any particular re-
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In McVey v. Hawkins," the court neither considered nor passed
upon the provisions of article IX, section 8 but limited its inquiry to
the restrictive effect of those constitutional provisions 57 establishing a
permanent public school fund and restricting the use thereof to the
establishment, maintenance and support of the public school system.
The court, in holding that the expenditure from the permanent school
fund to provide transportation for public and parochial school students
transgressed constitutional restrictions limiting the use of that fund
only insofar as that expenditure resulted in the transportation of paro-
chial school students, of necessity recognized that the provision of
transportation for the public school students there involved was a
proper expenditure for those educational purposes to which the use of
the permanent school fund is constitutionally limited.5 8 In thus indi-
cating that the expenditure of the permanent school fund for the pro-
viding of transportation to public school students constitutes an appro-
priation for educational purposes within the constitutional strictures
upon the use of that fund, it is submitted that the Court did not leave
open the availability of recourse to general revenues for the provision
of transportation to non-public school students, but merely expressed
its unwillingness to confront the issue of separation of church and
state posed by predicating its decision on constitutional provisions not
requiring such confrontation. Logical analysis of those constitutional
proscriptions contained in Article IX, Section 8 demonstrates that the
intendment thereof is to restrict the use of any public monies appro-
priated for educational purposes to the public school system and to
preclude the diversion of any educational funds to purposes other than
the public educational process. To construe the prohibitions of Article
IX, Section 8 as applicable only to the permanent "school fund" would
render its inclusion in the constitutional scheme, and particularly in
that portion thereof designated "Education," of no effect; the untena-
bility of such a construction is clearly demonstrated in Matthews V.
ligion or religious belief; citing the decision in the Harfst case, the court held that
the school in question could not constitutionally be supported by public school
moneys or any public funds.
56. 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953).
57. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
58. In the McVey case, the court's injunction was directed only against the
use of the permanent school fund for the provision of transportation to the paro-
chial school pupils there involved. The court did not find any constitutional trans-
gression in the utilization of the permanent school fund for the transport of public
school students, the court stating:
We . . . hold that the public school funds used to transport the pupils part
way to and from . . . [parochial schools] . .. are not used for the purpose
of maintaining free public schools and that such use of said funds is unlaw-
ful. It necessarily follows that such transportation of said students at the
expense of the district is unlawful and must be enjoined. 258 S.W.2d 927,
at 933-34. (Emphasis added.)
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Quinton&9 discussing, in part, the historical genesis of the permanent
school fund and the development of constitutional restrictions against
the use of any funds appropriated for educational purposes for any-
thing other than the establishment and maintenance of the public
school system. 0 In construing the provisions assuring the existence
of a permanent school fund together with those constitutional pro-
scriptions contained in Section 8, it cannot be contended that any pub-
lic funds appropriated for educational purposes, whether derived from
the permanent "school fund" or from general revenue, can be used for
purposes other than effectuation and facilitation of the public school
system; through such construction, it has been held that the intend-
ment of constitutional limitations upon the use of, and constitutional
proscriptions against the diversion of, any fund appropriated for edu-
cational purposes, regardless of its source, is to incorporate the doc-
trine of the separation of church and state in the educational sphere,
thus assuring the maintenance of the public school system thoroughly
separate and distinct from any sectarian school or influence.0. On this
basis, it has been held that "educational funds" are not lawfully ex-
59. 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 517 (1962).
60. In the Matthews case, the Court commented on those decisions which had
upheld the provision of publicly-financed transportation to parochial school stu-
dents on the ground that the source of appropriations for such transportation was
the state's general revenue and that all "educational monies" were not constitu-
tionally inhibited in the same respect as the permanent school fund. The Court in-
dicated that those decisions, in distinguishing between monies appropriated for
educational purposes from the public or permanent school fund and those appro-
priated from general revenue had lost sight of historical perspective in that re-
course to the state's general revenues, in addition to utilization of the permanent
school fund, when the same became necessary, was constitutionally maintainable
only because in furtherance of the state's duty to support and maintain the public
school system. Thus, the Court concluded that any funds appropriated for "edu-
cational purposes," whether drawn from a permanent school fund or from general
revenue, were constitutionally committed to the support and maintenance of the
free public schools and constitutionally inhibited against diversion for any other
purpose.
61. See State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 Atl. 835 (Super. Ct.
1934), appeal dismissed on other grounds, 39 Del. 187, 197 Atl. 478 (1938);
Williams v. Board of Trustees, 173 Ky. 708, 191 S.W. 507 (1917) ; Zellers v. Huff,
55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951); Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15
N.E.2d 576 (1938); Smith v. Donahue, 195 N.Y. Supp. 715, 202 App. Div. 656
(1922); Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941), appeal dis-
missed, 317 U.S. 588 (1942); Synod of Dakota v. State, 2 S.D. 366, 50 N.W. 632
(1891); State ex rel. Weiss v. District Ed., 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890). See
also Silver Lake Consol. School Dist. v. Parker, 238 Iowa 984, 29 N.W.2d 214
(1947); Sherrard v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963
(1942); Trustees of Rutgers College v. Morgan, 70 N.J.L. 460, 57 Atl. 250 (Sup.
Ct. 1904), aff'd, 71 N.J.L. 663, 60 Atl. 205 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905); Haas v. Inde-
pendent School Dist. No. 1, 69 S.D. 303, 9 N.W.2d 707 (1943); State ex rel. Van
Stratten v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192 N.W. 392 (1923).
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pended in the provision of transportation,2 secular textbooks63 and
other educational aids6' to private and parochial school students or
where the result of such expenditure is to divert such funds to schools
or institutions of learning controlled by sectarian or private interests6 5
III. POWERS OF AND RESTRICTIONS UPON THE STATE
IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION
The often-made contention 6 6 that since the state has imposed upon
its citizenry the duty to obtain an education meeting certain prescribed
standards, tax-raised funds may constitutionally be appropriated and
expended in furnishing transportation to private and parochial school
students in order to assist them in the fulfillment of that obligation,
does not take cognizance of those principles and precepts embodied in
constitutional proscriptions against the use of public funds for the
benefit of individuals.67 Noting that the provision of transportation to
school is only constitutionally defensible as an incident to, and an
62. State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 Atl. 835 (Super. Ct. 1934) ;
Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938) ; Gurney v. Ferguson,
190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941); See Silver Lake Consol. School Dist. v.
Parker, 238 Iowa 984, 29 N.E.2d 214 (1947) (implied); Sherrard v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963 (dictum); School Dist. of
Robinson Township v. Houghton, 387 Pa. 236, 128 A.2d 58 (1956) (implied); State
ex rel. Van Stratten v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192 N.W. 392 (1923) (implied).
63. Smith v. Donahue, 195 N.Y. Supp. 715, 202 App. Div. 656 (1922); Haas v.
Independent School Dist. No. 1, 69 S.D. 303, 9 N.W.2d 707 (1943).
64. See Otken v. Lamkin, 56 Miss. 758 (1879); Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501,
236 P.2d 949 (1951); Stein v. Brown, 125 Misc. 692, 211 N.Y. Supp. 822 (Sup.
Ct. 1925).
65. See Williams v. Board of Trustees, 173 Ky. 708, 191 S.W. 507 (1917);
Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951); Synod of Dakota v. State,
2 S.D. 366, 50 N.W. 632 (1891); State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd., 76 Wis. 177,
44 N.W. 967 (1890).
66. See Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), appeal dismissed,
868 U.S. 517 (1962); Silver Lake Consol. School Dist. v. Parker, 238 Iowa 984,
29 N.W.2d 214 (1947) ; Squires v. Inhabitants of City of Augusta, 155 Me. 151, 153
A.2d 80 (1959) ; Adams v. County Comm'rs, 180 Md. 550, 26 A.2d 377 (Ct. App.
1942); Board of Educ. v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 Atl. 628 (Ct. App. 1938);
Quinn v. School Comm., 332 Mass. 410, 125 N.E.2d 410 (1955); Chance v. Missis-
sippi State Textbook Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 132 N.J.L. 98, 39 A.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1944), rev'd, 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d
333 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945), aff'd on other grounds, 330 U.S. 1 (1946) ; Dickman v.
School Dist. No. 62C, 223 Ore. 347, 366 P.2d 533 (1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
823 (1962) ; School Dist. of Robinson Township v. Houghton, 387 Pa. 236, 128 A.2d
58 (1956); Haas v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 69 S.D. 303, 9 N.W.2d 707
(1943); Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist. No. 506, 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207
P.2d 198 (1949) ; Mitchell v. Consolidated Dist. No. 201, 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P.2d
79 (1943); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761
(1962).
67. See notes 12-14 supra and text supported thereby.
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integral part of, that public purpose and function embodied in the
public school system, many courts have squarely rejected,68 and others
have indicated the invalidity of, 9 that argument. The fallacy of this
contention is further explicated when those decisions dealing with the
powers of the state in the field of education, and the restrictions upon
the exercise of those powers, are examined.
The power of the state to protect and perpetuate itself and its in-
stitutions by requiring the education of its youth is exercisable in a
broad range, both with regard to the nature of the education required
and with regard to the state's ability to supervise and regulate all
schools, both public and private.70 The broad discretion of the state in
the field of education, however, must be exercised within the limits of
state constitutional provisions and state school legislation7 and, more-
over, cannot contravene those rights of parents and guardians with
regard to the rearing of their children and wards, the exercise of
which is within those freedoms and liberties protected against state
infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States.7 2
With particular reference to those rights of parents and guardians
concerning the education of their children and wards, the Supreme
Court of the United States held in Pierce v. Society of Sisters78 that
such rights are within the protection of the due process clause and
that the state, as parens patriae, cannot unreasonably interfere there-
with by taking hold of the child during its minority for purposes of
68. Visser, v. Nooksack Valley School Dist. No. 506, 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d
198 (1949); Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 201, 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135
P.2d '79 (1943); and see, Dickman v. School District No. 62C, 223 Ore. 347, 366
P.2d 533 (1961) (textbooks), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962).
69. See, Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), appeal dismissed,
368 U.S. 517 (1962); Silver Lake Consol. School Dist. v. Parker, 238 Iowa 984,
29 N.W.2d 214 (1947); School Dist. of Robinson Township v. Houghton, 387 Pa.
236, 128 A.2d 58 (1956) ; State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115
N.W.2d 761 (1962).
70. See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Bartels v. Iowa, 262
U.S. 404 (1923); Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589 (1915); People
ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927); Commonwealth v.
Roberts, 159 Mass. 372, 34 N.E. 402 (1893); State v. Johnson, 188 N.C. 591, 125
S.E. 183 (1924) ; State v. Jackson, 71 N.H. 522, 53 Atl. 1021 (1902) ; Parr v. State,
117 Ohio St. 23, 157 N.E. 555 (1927); Leeper v. Smith, 103 Tenn. 500, 53 S.W.
962 (1899) ; Flory v. Smith, 145 Va. 164, 134 S.E. 360 (1926).
71. See State ex rel. Clark v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 23 N.E. 946 (1890);
Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286 (1877).
72. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp (Murray v. Curlett),
83 Sup. Ct. 1560 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Farrington v. Tokushige,
273 U.S. 284 (1927) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
73. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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fostering, protecting and educating the child. This decision, which
involved no issue of freedom of religion,7 4 determined that the state
cannot foreclose the right of parents and guardians to choose a system
of instruction for their children and wards other than that system
established and maintained by the state; although framed in terms of
due process, the Court's conclusion is no more than a reaffirmation of
that fundamental concept that the child is not the mere creature of the
state and that "those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations." 75 This basic recognition, that absent particular
circumstances7 the welfare and care of children are the responsibility
of, and entrusted in, their parents and not the state is reflected in
those decisions holding that in matters of education the state must
remain completely neutral and cannot, on the basis of its interest in
the care and welfare of children, require that a particular curriculum
be laid down or that particular studies be taught where such require-
ments result in a deprivation of those rights of parents protected by
the due process clause.77
74. In the Pierce case, a parochial school and a privately owned and operated-
non-sectarian military academy challenged state legislation requiring all children
between certain ages to attend the public schools, contending that such legislation
was invalid as an arbitrary and unreasonable interference with the private prop-
erty rights of the schools and with the liberty of parents to determine that method
of instruction desired by them for their children. The court, in holding that the
state legislation was invalid as an unreasonable deprivation of the private prop-
erty rights of the schools' owners, also found that the due process guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment excluded any power of the state to standardize chil-
dren by forcing them to accept instruction in the public school system only.
In connection with the disparate treatment given to the decision in Pierce,
compare the statement of Mr. Justice Brennan with reference to that case that
"while one of the plaintiffs was indeed a parochial school, the case obviously de-
cided no First Amendment question but recognized only the constitutional right
to establish and patronize private schools-including parochial schools-which
meet the state's reasonable minimum curricular requirements." [School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560, at 1585 (1963) (concurring
opinion) ], with that of Mr. Justice Stewart that "It has become accepted that the
decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters ... upholding the right of parents to send
their children to nonpublic schools, was ultimately based upon the recognition of
the validity of the free exercise claim involved in that situation." [Id. at 1619 (dis-
senting opinion) ].
75. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra note 73, at 535.
76. See, e.g., decisions dealing with the commission of juvenile delinquents to
state schools and compelling them to submit to the curriculum there laid down,
Ex parte Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 Pac. 563 (1908); People eX rel. O'Connell v.
Turner, 55 Ill. 280 (1870); State ex rel. Cave v. Tincher, 258 Mo. 1, 166 S.W.
1028 (1914).
77. The doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against unreasonable inter-
ference with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
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The public educational system constitutes a governmental function
undertaken by the state and premised upon the public purpose sub-
served thereby; as a part of that public educational system, the state,
under specified conditions, has provided for publicly-financed trans-
portation. The providing of such transportation to public school stu-
dents has been sustained, not on the ground that the state stands as
parens patriae in caring for and protecting the welfare of children en-
rolled in the public school system, but as a valid administrative pro-
vision effectuating the operation of the public educational process by
making that process available to those who without such transporta-
tion could not obtain it. 78 The state, as parens patriae, cannot pre-
clude parents from choosing programs of education for their children
other than that public system of education maintained by it; when
such other programs of instruction are chosen, it is submitted that the
state cannot, as parens patriae, provide the means of participating in
such private educational processes by assuming and taking over the
responsibility of parents for the transportation of their children.70
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS UPON THE STATE'S
ABILITY TO "PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE"
The fundamental law of the state, set forth in the provisions of its
constitution, restricts and limits the powers of the state to act; within
the interstices of these restrictions and limitations, and in harmony
with them, the state is empowered to provide for and promote the
general welfare of its inhabitants through the exercise of its police
power.8 0 The state, by declaring that it is thereby promoting the
education of children under their control is reflected in the decision in Pierce V.
Society of Sisters and has been consistently followed by the United States Supreme
Court; see, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, (Murray v. Cur-
lett), 83 Sup. Ct. 1560 (1963) ; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) ; West Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Farrington v. Toku-
shige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
78. See notes 31 and 32 supra and text supported thereby.
79. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 327-33, 199 Atl. 628,
634-36 (Ct. App. 1938) (dissent of Parke, J.). See also Board of Educ. for Ind.
School Dist. No. 52 v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911, 913 (Okla. 1963):
The law leaves to every man the right to entertain such religious views as
appeal to his individual conscience, and to provide for the religious instruc-
tion and training of his children to the extent and in the manner he deems
essential or desirable. When he chooses to seek for them educational facilities
which combine secular and religious instruction, he is faced with the neces-
sity of assuming the financial burden which that choice entails.
80. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271,
94 N.E. 431 (1911) ; Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 75 N.E. 404 (1905) ; Colon v.
Lisk, 153 N.Y. 188, 47 N.E. 302 (1897) ; Stein v. Brown, 125 Misc. 692, 211 N.Y.
Supp. 822 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ; St. Patrick's Church Soc'y v. Heermans, 68 Misc. 487,
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health, welfare and safety of its inhabitants, cannot exceed or trans-
gress those strictures upon its ability to act contained in its constitu-
tion.s1 Among the more controversial of these inhibitions upon state
activity are those provisions contained in the overwhelming majority
of state constitutions, 2 and in the Constitution of Missouri,83 interdict-
ing state interference with religion through restrictions upon its ex-
ercise and aid or support of it. Equally important, although appar-
ently less controversial, is that fundamental constitutional proscrip-
tion against the use of public monies for other than public purposes,
8 4
for in those controversies involving the application of the principle of
the separation of church and state to the area of education, this con-
cept has proved to be a most important but inadequately analyzed
underlying issue.
The fallacy inherent in the consideration of the question of the
existence of a public purpose as one separate and distinct from the
question of whether a particular expenditure of public monies con-
travenes constitutional proscriptions against aid or support to sec-
tarian interests and institutions is reflected in many of the decisions
dealing with the constitutionality of furnishing publicly-financed
transportation to parochial and private school pupils. Those decisions
which have invalidated the providing of such transportation on the
ground that the benefit of the expenditure involved inures to the pri-
vate or parochial school attended by the pupils for whom such trans-
portation is provided85 would, if their reasoning were carried to its
logical extreme, invalidate all appropriations of public funds where
it is shown that the expenditure thereof results in an aid or benefit
124 N.Y. Supp. 705 (Sup. Ct. 1910); State ex Tel. Richey v. Smith, 42 Wash. 237,
84 Pac. 851 (1906).
81. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937); City of
Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487 (1883); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 655 (1875); Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961),
appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 517 (1962); Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200,
15 N.E.2d 576 (1938); Board of Educ. for Ind. School Dist. No. 52 v. Antone, 384
P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963) ; Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941),
appeal dismissed, 317 U.S. 588 (1942); Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, 223
Ore. 347, 366 P.2d 533 (1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962); Visser v. Nook-
sack Valley School Dist. No. 506, 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949); Mitchell
v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 201, 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943); State
ex Tel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962).
82. See Legislative Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University, Index
Digest of State Constitutions 369, 376, 380, 904-08 (2d ed. 1959); La Noue,
Decision for the Sixties: Public Funds for Parochial Schools? 14 n. 40 (Depart-
ment of Religious Liberty, National Council of Churches 1963).
83. Mo. CONST. art. I, §§ 5-7; art. IX, § 8.
84. See notes 13 and 14 supra and text supported thereby.
85. State ex tel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 Atl. 835 (Super. Ct. 1934),
appeal dismissed on other grounds, 39 Del. 187, 197 Atl. 478 (1938); Judd
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to sectarian interests or religious institutions. Thus, to use those
often-cited classic examples,86 the providing of fire and police protec-
tion or any of the other utility services furnished to the community at
public expense would, by carrying this line of reasoning to its logical
extreme, be constitutionally invalid, since churches, parochial schools
and other sectarian institutions and interests would receive a benefit
from the expenditure of public funds involved in the providing of such
services. On the other hand, those decisions which have sustained the
validity of legislation providing publicly-financed transportation to
private and parochial students through acceptance of legislative dec-
larations that the promotion of education and the protection of school
children is promoted thereby, which acceptance has often been based
upon that judicial proclivity to find a statute constitutional whenever
possible, 7 have held that such legislation does not contravene those
v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938) ; Visser v. Nooksack Valley
School Dist. No. 506, 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949) ; State ex rel. Reynolds
v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962).
86. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1946); Snyder v.
Town of Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S.
299 (1961); Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941), appeal
dismissed, 317 U.S. 588 (1942); Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist. No. 506,
33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198; State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148,
115 N.W.2d 761 (1962).
87. See, e.g., Adams v. County CommI'rs, 180 Md. 550, 26 A.2d 377 (Ct. App.
1942) ; Board of Educ. v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 At. 628 (Ct. App. 1938). In
the Wheat case, the court upheld the constitutionality of a statute providing
for utilization of public school transportation facilities for the conveyance of
private and parochial school pupils to that public school nearest to the non-public
school attended by the particular pupil involved, rejecting the contentions that
such provision constituted the use of public funds for a private purpose, that the
expenditures necessarily incurred by the extra expense of transporting non-
public school pupils constituted a violation of the constitutional proscription
against incursions upon the permanent school fund and, that such appropriation
would constitute a contribution to a place of worship in contravention of
constitutional provisions precluding such contributions. In sustaining the legis-
lation's validity, the court adverted to the fact that public school transportation
was extended only to overcome the disadvantage of distance for many pupils
resulting as a consequence of the consolidation of schools but stated that that
purpose did not prevent public utilization of any further advantages that might
accrue from the use of the transportation system; thus, the court held that since
the purpose of protection against traffic hazards was a possible one, the legisla-
tion should not be regarded as a provision for the supplying of public school
facilities to private and parochial school pupils. The court stressed the interest
of the state in seeing to it that all children of school age acquired an education
by attending some school and that under compulsory education laws attendance
at an accredited private or parochial school was satisfactory; thus, the court con-
cluded that the accommodation of non-public school pupils in public school buses
"appeared" to be within the proper limits of enforcement of the duty of compul-
sory education imposed by the state and held,
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constitutional strictures against the use of state power or public
monies to aid or support sectarian interests and institutions ;88 the
reasoning of these decisions, when logically extended, would support
the providing of crayons, pens, pencils, stationery, maps, charts, the
building and furnishing of schoolhouses and even the employment of
teachers, on the theory that the benefit obtained thereby results in the
promoting of education or the care or protection of school children.
Decisions based on either of these two lines of reasoning, although
reaching opposite conclusions, support the proposition that public
monies and state power cannot constitutionally be used in aid of or
Even though the statute ordering it may be open to another interpretation,
if the transportation with this object is a constitutional action, the statute
must be construed as having the object, because the Court is required to ad-
mit the constitutionality of an act . . . if it can be brought within the exer-
cise of any constitutional power. Id. at 322-23, 199 Atl. at 632. (Emphasis
added.)
The decision in the Wheat case was followed and reaffirmed in the Adams case
where the legislation involved was considerably different from that under con-
sideration in the Wheat decision. In Adams, the court sustained the constitu-
tionality of legislation providing a public fund to be used to reimburse parochial
schools, owning their own buses and transporting their pupils, for expenses in-
curred in such transportation, payments being based on the proportion of miles
travelled by various buses under contract with each school. In rejecting the con-
tention that the statutory provision in question constituted the appropriation of
public funds for private purposes, the Court cited Wheat as controlling and
stated,
It is usually held that the furnishing of transportation to children of paro-
chial schools is . . . an appropriation of public funds to private purposes.
Those courts have construed the aid to have been given to the schools
rather than to the children in attending some school, while the view taken
in the Wheat case was that it could have been the design of the General
Assembly in the statute considered to give aid and protection to the children
on the highways, or to facilitate the compulsory attendance at some school,
and that the possibility of this design prevented holding the enactment un-
constitutional. . . . Id. at 556, 26 A.2d at 380. (Emphasis added.)
The court also rejected the contention that under the legislation the county
commissioners were authorized to turn public money over to parochial schools,
the court indicating that if it was valid for the county to convey non-public school
children, the fact that the county commissioners joined with the non-public schools
in affording such transportation appeared equally well founded in principle and
free from objections; in this connection, the court stated,
This last consideration seems, too, to support the action against constitu-
tional objections. If the county's carrying the children of parochial schools
by any means is a valid action, as we have decided in the Wheat case, one
not necessarily to be considered a gift to the schools, the joining with the
schools in supporting facilities already provided would seem valid. The deci-
sion in the Wheat case that the public funds may be expended to aid the
children appears to validate the action questioned in this one. Id. at 556,
26 A.2d at 380. (Emphasis added.)
88. Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946) ; Snyder v. Town
of Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299
(1961) ; Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d 930 (1945) ; Everson v. Board
of Educ., 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945), reversing 132 N.J.L.
98, 39 A.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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support to sectarian interests and institutions; their unity in dis-
harmony results from the failure to recognize that where a public
purpose actually exists, the fact that private persons or sectarian
interests and institutions benefit from the appropriation and expendi-
ture of public monies in the exercise of that public function is im-
material.89
The failure to recognize the basic proposition that the constitution-
ality of a particular expenditure of public monies does not turn upon
the nature or character of the recipient of the benefit of such expendi-
ture, but upon the purpose of the payment, is apparent in those deci-
sions which have invalidated the providing of publicly-financed trans-
portation or other "educational" aids to private and parochial school
pupils on the ground that such provision constitutes a benefit, directly
or indirectly, to the private or parochial school itself in contravention
of constitutional proscriptions against such assistance.0 This failure
89. See footnotes 14-16 supra, and text supported thereby.
90. State eX Tel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 Atl. 835 (Super. Ct. 1934),
appeal dismissed on other grounds, 39 Del. 187, 197 Atl. 478 (1938); Judd
v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938); Smith v. Donahue, 202
App. Div. 656, 195 N.Y. Supp. 715 (1922) ; Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist.
No. 506, 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nus-
baum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962); See School Dist. No. 8 v. Stoeper,
Civil No. 6100, D. Colo., July 3, 1961.
The Traub case (State ex Tel. Traub v. Brown) is one of the earliest decisions
dealing with the question of the provision of transportation to non-public school
students. In that case, the Court held that a statute providing an appropriation
for the direct transportation of children to parochial schools contravened the
following provision of the Delaware Constitution:
Art. X, § 3-No portion of any fund now existing, or which may hereafter
be appropriated, or raised by tax, for educational purposes, shall be appro-
priated to, or used by, or in aid of any sectarian, church or denominational
school.
The Court indicated that the constitutional provision set out above not only pro-
scribed appropriations in aid of sectarian schools but also prohibited the use of
appropriations, once made, in aid of such schools. Although the Court recognized
that the appropriation was not directly made to any sectarian school, the Court
held that the expenditure appeared to be made to be used by or in aid of such
schools and concluded,
We are of the opinion that to furnish free transportation to pupils attending
sectarian schools, is to aid the schools. It helps build up, strengthen and
make successful the schools as organizations. Id. at 187, 172 Atl. at 837.(Emphasis added.)
In Smith v. Donahue, the court held that the use of public funds for the
provision of textbooks and ordinary school supplies to non-public school pupils
was violative of New York's constitution. The statutory provision in question
provided that textbooks and ordinary school supplies be furnished to all pupils of
each school district, and it was contended that the statute should be construed to
mean that such books and supplies were to be furnished to the pupils and not to
the particular school which they might attend. The court held that, even accept-
ing that construction of the legislation, there plainly was a violation of con-
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is also apparent in those decisions which have sustained the providing
stitutional provisions and premised its decision upon the following provision of
the New York Constitution:
Art. IX, § 4-Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof, shall use its
property or credit or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be
used, directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance . . . of any school or
institution of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any
religious denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is
taught.
The court pointed out that in the case of the public schools there could be no
question that textbooks and ordinary supplies were furnished directly to such
schools as opposed to the contention that they were furnished to the students as
distinct from the schools and therefore that there could be no such contention in
the case of the non-public schools. The court, in adverting to the contended for
construction that the materials were furnished to the pupils themselves and not
to the schools which they attended, concluded:
It seems to us to be giving a strained and unusual meaning to words if we
hold that the books and the ordinary school supplies, when furnished for the
use of pupils, is a furnishing to the pupils, and not a furnishing in aid or
maintenance of a school of learning. It seems very plain that such furnish-
ing is at least indirectly in aid of the institution and that, if not an actual
violation of the words, it is in violation of the true intent and meaning of the
Constitution, and in consequence equally unconstitutional. Id. at 722, 202
App. Div. at 664.
That provision of the then New York Constitution set out above, was held de-
terminative in Judd v. Board of Educ., wherein the court invalidated legislation
providing for equal use of transportation facilities by private and parochial school
pupils under a transportation system authorizing the transport of public school
pupils residing in any school district not maintaining a public school to a district
in which such school was maintained. The court adverted to that provision of
the then New York Constitution and, in particular, the words "directly or indi-
rectly" in rejecting the contention that the provision of such transportation was
not an aid to or in support of non-public schools; the court held that the in-
tendment of those words was to proscribe any expenditure which might be of
benefit to private or sectarian institutions or promotional of their interests and
purposes. Citing the decision in Traub, the court concluded that, since free
transportation of pupils induced attendance at the school, the provision of trans-
port to non-public schools constituted an aid to or was in support of such schools
within the meaning of the constitutional proscriptions.
In Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist. No. 506, the court construed the
provisions of legislation providing that all children attending school in accordance
with the compulsory attendance laws should be entitled to use the transportation
facilities provided by the school district in which they resided. The basic question
involved was whether that legislation compelled, or purported to compel, the
board of education of a particular school district to furnish publicly-financed
transportation to children attending parochial schools and the court considered
the following provisions of the Washington Constitution applicable to the de-
termination of that question:
Art. I, § 11-No public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or the support of
any religious establishment ....
Art. IX, § 4-All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the
public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence.
The court held that school bus transportation to or from religious or sectarian
schools constituted support or maintenance of such schools within the terms of
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of such transportation or other "educational" aids on the ground that
the recipient of the benefit thereby provided is the pupil and not the
private or parochial school which the pupil may attend. 1 The de-
constitutional proscriptions against the same, the court concluding that trans-
portation was a vital and continuous financial consideration in both the inception
and operation of schools, and stating:
Any private, religious, or sectarian schools which are founded upon, or
fostered by, assurances that free public transportation facilities will be made
available to the prospective pupils thereof, occupy the position of receiving,
or expecting to receive a direct, substantial, and continuing public subsidy to
the schools, as such, thus encouraging their construction and maintenance,
and enhancing their attendance, at public expense. Id. at 708, 207 P.2d. at
203. (Court's emphasis.)
In State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, the court held unconstitutional amend-
ments to the school transportation statutes authorizing utilization of existing
public school transportation facilities for the provision of conveyance of non-
public school pupils to and from the nearest public school which they were en-
titled to attend. The court premised its decision upon, and held the amendments
violative of, the following provision of the Wisconsin Constitution:
Art. I, § 18-The right of every man to worship Almighty God according to
the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any
man be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to
maintain any ministry, against his consent; nor shall any control of, or
interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be
given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall
any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies,
or religious or theological seminaries.
Noting that parochial schools constitute "religious seminaries" within the mean-
ing of the clause set out above, the court held that the operation of the statutory
amendments would result in the expenditure of public funds for their benefit since,
prior to the amendments, certain parochial schools had been paying part or all of
the cost of the transportation out of their school funds and therefore they would
gain financially by the operation of the admendment, whereas others which did not
provide such transportation would benefit through increased enrollment which
the free transportation of pupils would induce. The existence of such financial
gain and the benefit of increased enrollment inuring to the parochial schools by
the operation of the amendments involved were held by the court to transgress
the constitutional provisions set out above and, in particular, the last sentence
thereof.
School Dist. No. 8 v. Stoeper suggests a tendency toward the invalidation of
legislation providing for the transportation of parochial school students on a basis
similar to those bases used by the decisions set out above; in that case, although
the constitutional issue was neither properly before the court nor determinative
of the question involved, the court indicated the following:
. . . It might be pointed out, however, that public assistance to any relig-
ious or sectarian society or for any sectarian purpose or to help support or
sustain any school operated by a sectarian group is prohibited in Article IX,
Section 7 of the Constitution of Colorado. The weight of authority in otherjurisdictions, where legislative attempts have been made to provide transpor-
tation to parochial school pupils in public school buses, in the face of similar
constitutional provisions, is that such statutes trespass upon the constitu-
tional prohibition.
91. Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946); Snyder v.
Town of Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365
U.S. 299 (1961); Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d 930 (1945);
Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929), aff'd
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termination of whether it is the pupil or the school which he attends
sub nora. Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Adams v.
County Comm'rs, 180 Md. 550, 26 A.2d 377 (Ct. App. 1942); Board of Educ. v.
Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 Atl. 628 (Ct. App. 1938); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945), aff'd, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), re-
versing, 132 N.J.L. 98, 39 A.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1944); see Squires v. Inhabitants
of City of Augusta, 155 Me. 151, 153 A.2d 80 (1959).
The "child-benefit" theory, that "educational aids" may be afforded to non-
public school students as a welfare measure inuring to the child, had its inception
in Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., a case upholding the validity of legis-
lation providing for the appropriation of monies from the general revenue to
purchase school textbooks for distribution to all school children of the state of
Louisiana. The constitutional attack made against this legislation was a broad
one. The contention was that the statute violated constitutional proscriptions
against the use of public funds for other than a public purpose, against the use
of public monies, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church or denomination or
for other private purposes, and prohibiting the use of public funds for the aid or
support of any private or sectarian school. The court noted that prior to the
enactment of this legislation parents of public school students, as well as parents
of private and parochial school students, were required to purchase textbooks for
the use of their children. In holding that none of the constitutional proscriptions
alleged to have been violated were violated by the legislation in question, the court
stated that the appropriation was made for the specific purpose of providing bene-
fits for school children of the state, and that it was for their benefit and the benefit
resulting to the state from the promotion of education that such appropriations
were made. In this connection, the court concluded:
True, these children attend school, public or private, the latter, sectarian or
nonsectarian, and that the books are to be furnished them for their use, free
of cost, whichever they attend. The schools, however, are not the beneficiaries
of these appropriations. They obtain nothing from them, nor are they re-
lieved of a single obligation because of them. The school children and the
state alone are the beneficiaries. Id. at 1019, 123 So. at 660. (Emphasis
added.)
In Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941),
the court had before it the question of the validity of a statute providing for the
establishment of a state textbook board to select, purchase and distribute free text-
books by loaning them to pupils in certain grades in all accredited elementary
schools of the state. The court found that the operation of such legislation did
not contravene the following constitutional provisions:
MIss. CONST. art. VIII, § 208-No religious or other sect or sects shall ever
control any part of the school or other educational funds of this state; nor
shall any funds be appropriated toward the support of any sectarian schools,
or to any school that at the time of receiving such appropriation is not con-
ducted as a public school. (Emphasis added.)
The court, in viewing the legislation and applying it against the constitutional
provisions, stressed that those constitutional provisions concerning the separation
of church and state were directed at the proscription of control by one over the
other and concluded that such bar to control could not preclude the state, in dis-
charging its obligations as parens patriae, from affording welfare benefits to al
the citizens of the state. Noting that attendance at a private or sectarian school
complied with compulsory education legislation, the court stated that the intend-
ment of the Legislature, in enacting the statute in question, was to carry out its
constitutional mandate to encourage the promotion of education by furnishing
"aids" to children in order to enable them to satisfy the duty of school attendance.
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which is the beneficiary of legislation providing for transportation or
In adverting to the situation with regard to private and parochial school students,
the court held that the legislation did not constitute a benefit to the private or
parochial school attended by the student but only provided a benefit for the in-
dividual pupil; thus, the court concluded:
Nor is the loaning of such books under such circumstances to the individual
pupils a direct or indirect aid to the respective schools which they attend, al-
though school attendance is compulsory. Such pupil is free to attend a
proper public or private school, sectarian or otherwise. Id. at 475, 200 So. at
713.
Relying upon the assertion of promotion of the public welfare, the court in
Nichols v. Henry upheld the validity of a statute providing for transportation of
non-public school pupils directly to the non-public school which they attended.
The act in question, appropriately entitled "an Act to promote the public welfare
by providing supplemental transportation along highways, which have no sidewalks,
for children attending school in compliance with the compulsory attendance laws"
provided that the transportation therein contemplated be financed by separate
appropriations from the general funds of each county and not out of any fund or
taxes raised or levied for "educational purposes" or appropriated in aid of the
public schools. The court held that the statute did not transgress any constitu-
tional proscriptions against aid or support to a place of worship and further
that it did not contravene constitutional limitations upon the use of public monies
for other than a public purpose. The court, restricting the holding in Sherrard v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963 (1942), to the proposi-
tion that the permanent school fund could not be utilized in providing transporta-
tion to parochial school pupils, held that the purpose to be accomplished by the
legislation in question was a public one in that it constituted the extension of
welfare benefits to all persons within the class intended to be protected and
safeguarded by the provision of school transportation. In thus positing the ex-
istence of a public purpose, the court concluded that the benefit of the legislation
inured to the school children and stated, that it
. . . cannot be said . . . that tax legislation to provide our school children
with safe transportation is not tax legislation for a public purpose. Neither
can it be said that such legislation, or such taxation, is in aid of a church,
or of a private, sectarian, or parochial school, nor that it is other than what
it is designed and purports to be . . . legislation for the health and safety
. . . The fact that in a strained and technical sense, the school might derive
an indirect benefit from the enactment, is not sufficient to defeat the declared
purpose and the practical and wholesome effect of the law. Id. at 443-44,
191 S.W.2d at 934.
Although the prior decision in the Sherrard case could be restricted to the narrow
ground that the use of the public school fund there involved for the provision of
transportation constituted a transgression of constitutional inhibitions with re-
gard to the use of the permanent school fund, the court in the Nichols case disre-
garded the fact that in the Sherrard case the court rejected the contention that the
furnishing of transportation to parochial school students constituted a benefit to
the child and not to the school. In that case, the court specifically stated that the
theory that the benefit of transportation inures to the child and not to the school,
and that therefore it can constitutionally be afforded to non-public school pupils,
was "lacking in persuasive reasoning and logic." Id. at 478, 171 S.W.2d at 968.
In considering the validity of the provision of publicly-financed transportation
to parochial school pupils, the appellate court in Everson v. Board of Edue. agreed
with the lower court that the only constitutional provision involved was that assur-
ing the inviolability of the permanent school fund but reversed the decision of the
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other "educational" aids is immaterial since in either instance the
lower court (132 N.J.L. 98, 39 A.2d 75) on the ground that there was no proof
that any part of the permanent school fund was used as a source for the pro-
vision of the transportation in question. The Court of Errors and Appeals ad-
verted to the purpose of the inclusion of the inviolability provision and noted that
by amendment to the constitution a mandate was imposed upon the Legislature
to provide and promote free public education, and that in compliance with this
mandate the Legislature had levied a state school tax to pay the cost of such
education. The court then stressed that statutory provisions enacted pursuant to
that mandate were subject to alteration, modification and revocation without limi-
tation by those constitutional inhibitions applicable to the permanent school fund;
and therefore the court concluded that all "school monies" were not within those
constitutional proscriptions inhibiting the use of the permanent school fund to the
public school system. In thus disregarding the fact that recourse to the general
revenues was authorized only in order to carry out the constitutional mandate to
maintain and support the public educational process, the court reached its con-
clusion that the Legislature could appropriate general revenues or authorize the
use of local funds for the transportation of pupils to any school on the ground
that such transportation resulted in the promotion and facilitation of education.
The court stressed that the provision of transportation inured to the benefit of
the school child and not the school which he attended; in thus holding that the
public funds were expended for the benefit of individuals, the court also indicated
that there was no transgression of constitutional provisions precluding the use
of public funds for private purposes since the purpose of the legislation was to
effectuate compliance with the compulsory education laws thus promoting the
general interest in the furtherance of education and the general welfare resulting
from the promotion of education. Thus, the court concluded that since education
is a matter of public concern and since transportation is complementary to and
in aid of the facilitation of education, the use of tax-raised monies in the promo-
tion of education by providing transportation did not constitute the expenditure
of public monies for other than a public purpose.
The statute involved in Bowker v. Baker provided that the board of any school
district could allow transportation to pupils entitled to attend the district's school
but in attendance at a school other than the public school, "under the same terms,
in the same manner and over the same routes as children attending the public
school." It was contended that when the school board in question voted to authorize
the use of its transportation facilities for the conveyance of parochial school pupils
in accordance with the statute, there was a violation of the following provisions
of the state constitution:
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 30-Neither the legislature nor any county, city and
county, township, school district, or other municipal corporation, shall ever
make an appropriation, or pay from any public fund whatever, or grant
anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian pur-
pose, or help to support or sustain any school, college, university, hospital, or
other institution controlled by any religious creed, church, or sectarian de-
nomination whatever;
Art. IX, § 8-No public money shall ever be appropriated for the support
of any sectarian or denominational school, or any school not under the ex-
clusive control of the officers of the public schools; . . .
The court, in upholding the constitutionality of the statute in question, stressed
the fact that embodied in it was the exercise of the state's police power in promot-
ing the public welfare by aiding the education of the young, and the court stressed
that the direct benefit conferred by the statute inured to children with only an
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purpose of the expenditure involved is to facilitate and effectuate the
incidental and, to this court, immaterial benefit resulting to the private schools;
in recognizing the existence of such an "indirect benefit," the court held that
such did not constitute an appropriation of public monies for private purposes
and did not violate any constitutional proscriptions against state aid to denomina-
tional schools. Thus, the court set forth its adherence to the "child-benefit" theory,
as follows:
Raising the standard of intelligence of youth and providing for the safety
of children are legitimate objects of government and are authorized under
the police powers. It is also true that transportation of pupils to and from
public schools is one of the legitimate methods adopted to help promote
education and safeguard children. If the transportation of pupils to and
from public schools is authorized . . . and if the benefit from that trans-
portation is to the pupils, then an incidental benefit flowing to a denomina-
tional school from free transportation to its pupils should not be sufficient to
deprive the Legislature of the power to authorize a school district to trans-
port such pupils. Id. at 663, 167 P.2d at 261. (Emphasis added.)
The court noted that under another statute the transportation costs of veterans
attending school under the State Veterans Educational Act had been upheld as
not in violation of constitutional provisions [Veterans' Welfare Bd. v. Riley, 189
Cal. 159, 208 Pac. 678 (1922) ] and held that if the payment of such transportation
costs did not violate constitutional proscriptions against the use of public funds for
private purposes, then certainly permitting a ". . . little child to occupy a vacant
seat in a school bus in order that he might attend a denominational school cannot
be held to be such a violation." Id. at 665, 167 P.2d at 262.
The "child-benefit" theory was successfully invoked in Snyder V. Town of
Newtown, a declaratory judgment action involving the constitutionality of a
statute empowering a municipal corporation to provide transportation to pupils
attending non-profit private schools as well as those attending public schools, such
transportation to be paid out of the general fund of the particular municipal
corporation or town. The general fund of the Town of Newtown included monies
derived from property taxes, the permanent school fund, fees, licenses and per-
mits and it was established that the transportation involved in this case had been
provided to non-public school pupils from such fund; the court thus held that the
statute was unconstitutional only insofar as it made available, for transportation
of pupils attending other than public schools, funds derived from the permanent
school fund, since to that extent the statute would contravene constitutional pro-
scriptions against incursions upon the permanent school fund for other than
public school purposes. The court, however, did hold that the legislation was not
violative of constitutional provisions stating that no person should be compelled
by law to join or support any congregation, church or religious association. The
court indicated that transportation legislation is intended to facilitate the oppor-
tunity of children to obtain an education and that education, in itself, subserves
a public purpose. In thus finding the existence of a public purpose in the pro-
motion of education, notwithstanding the fact that when such transportation is
afforded to parochial or private school students the education thus promoted is
sectarian or non-public in nature, the court held that a statute which served a
public purpose could not be invalidated because it incidentally benefited a limited
number of persons and thus held that the Town of Newtown, by providing trans-
portation for pupils of parochial schools, did not thereby compel the support of
parochial schools and by doing so, the support of the particular church main-
taining such schools. The court stated that the purpose and intendment of the
legislation in question was to promote the general welfare in the cause of educa-
tion and to afford protection and safety for children, thus aiding parents and their
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educational process, which process encompasses both the child and the
school; thus, the providing of transportation brings together those
elements whose coalescence is necessary to the operation of the educa-
tional process, and the furnishing of "educational" materials facili--
tates and assists the operation of the educational process. The pro-
viding of publicly-financed aids and benefits to the public educational
process is constitutionally defensible as an exercise of a governmental
function furthering the maintenance and development of the public
school system ;92 the use of public monies to aid or benefit private or
parochial educational processes is without the scope of that gov-
ernmental function and there exists no other constitutional basis
upon which such use of public monies can be grounded. Certain de-
cisions in this area have recognized that any attempt to bifurcate the
benefit conferred by the providing of transportation and other "edu-
cational" aids results in the establishment of a false dichotomy and
have recognized that the constitutional prohibition against aid or sup-
port to private or parochial schools and institutions of learning is one
that operates against aid to such schools and institutions in their edu-
cational capacity and that any public assistance to the educational
process of such schools and institutions falls within the constitutional
children and not the particular school or schools which such children attended;
thus, the court concluded:
It [the statute] primarily serves the public health, safety and welfare andfosters religion. In the light of our history and policy, it cannot be said to
compel support of any church. It therefore does not come within the pro-
scription of article seventh. It comes up to, but does not breach, the 'wall
of separation' between church and state. Id. at 391, 161 A.2d 778. (Em-
phasis added.)
Although no constitutional question was involved in Squires v. Inhabitants of
City of Augusta, the court there indicated its adherence to the viability of the
"child-benefit" theory. The court, in invalidating an ordinance for the provision
of transportation of pupils to and from non-public schools, did so on the basis
that the municipal corporation involved was one of limited powers, and the
validity of its ordinances was dependent upon the existence of proper enabling
legislation. In referring to the extent of the state's involvement with the educa-
tional system, the court noted that many statutes providing for the utilization
of public monies by municipal corporations for the financing of educational activi-
ties had been enacted and sustained by the state and its courts and held that
transportation of pupils to public schools constituted a proper educational activity.
In this regard, the court concluded:
We are satisfied that a properly worded enabling act, authorizing muncipali-
ties to expend funds for the transportation of children to private schools not
operated for profit, if one were in fact to be enacted by the Legislature,
would meet constitutional requirements. In so saying, we recognize that the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Everson is the law of
the land and that the provisions of the Maine Constitution relating to the
expenditure of public monies for public purposes and to the separation of
the church and state, carry no more stringent prohibitions than the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. Id. at 164, 153
A.2d at 87.
92. See notes 29-34 supra and text supported thereby.
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ban.93 These decisions demonstrate that the issue is not whether the
93. Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), appeal dismissed, 368
U.S. 517 (1962); Board of Educ. for Ind. School Dist. No. 52 v. Antone, 384 P.2d
911 (Okla. 1963); Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941),
appeal dismissed, 317 U.S. 588 (1942); Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, 366
P.2d 533 (Ore. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962); Mitchell v. Consolidated
School Dist. No. 201, 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943); see Sherrard v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963 (1942) (dictum);
State eX 'el. Van Stratten v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192 N.W. 392 (1923) (by
implication).
The court in Gurney v. Ferguson dealt with legislation providing that when a
school district authorized transportation for its public school pupils, children
attending private or parochial schools along or near the route of the public school
bus were equally entitled to the benefits of such transportation; under the opera-
tion of this statute, those children attending private and parochial schools would
not be transported to those schools but only to points on the route of the public
school bus. The court, in holding this "shared-ride" transportation statute in-
valid, found that it contravened the following provision of the Oklahoma Con-
stitution:
Art. II, § 5-No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,
applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or sup-
port of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the use,
benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religiousteacher or dignitary, or sectarian institution as such. (Emphasis added.)In overruling the contention that parochial schools were not sectarian institutions
within this constitutional prohibition, the court referred to the provision in the
Oklahoma Constitution that the state is to maintain and establish a public educa-
tional system free from sectarian control and held that that provision, read in con-
nection with the constitutional provision set out above, made it clear that the use
of public money or property for sectarian or parochial schools or school systems
was prohibited. The court noted that the expenditure of public funds under this
statute was confined to children attending school and indicated that this refuted
any contention that the transportation was for the benefit of children generally
and not for schools or that such transportation was furnished in regulating traffic
within the police power or primarily in promoting the health and safety of the
children of the state. In rejecting the contention that the provision of transporta-
tion was not a benefit or aid to the school, the court proceeded to analyze the
basis upon which such transportation to public school pupils was afforded and
noted that the expenditure of public funds in the provision of such transportation
had been upheld as a proper expenditure in furtherance of the state's constitu-
tional duty and public function in maintaining schools as organizations and insti-
tutions. The court stressed that if the cost of school buses and the maintenance
and operation thereof were not in aid of the public educational process, then
expenses therefor out of the permanent school funds or other funds appropriated
for "educational purposes" would be unauthorized and illegal and that since it
was established that the expenditure of public funds for such transportation was
constitutionally defensible because in furtherance of the public educational
process, it followed that when pupils of a private or parochial school were trans-
ported, that service was likewise in aid of and promotional of the educational
process carried on by the school attended by such pupils. The court pointed out
that the state had no authority to maintain or aid any educational process other
than the public school system and that it was proscribed from affording aid or
support to sectarian schools and private educational institutions, as such, that is,
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institution or the child is aided but whether the educational function
in their capacity as the exponent of an educational process. The court concluded
that the intent and purpose, as well as the clear language of the constitutional
expression, demonstrated that such aid or support could not be extended when it
merely aided the educational process carried on by the particular school and did
not directly aid the school itself by use of vague theories turning upon a determi-
nation of to whom the primary impact of the benefit of such legislation was
directed.
In the case of Board of Educ. for Ind. School Dist. No. 52 v. Antone, the
court dealt with the contention that the decision in Gurney 'v. Ferguson was no
longer controlling with regard to the validity of providing publicly financed trans-
portation to parochial school students since that decision was handed down prior
to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Everson case. The court re-
jected the contention that Everson stood for the proposition that by framing
legislation as directed toward providing for needy children, providing for the
education of all children within the state, and affording facilities for the same,
this determined that the legislation was valid as directed at the general welfare
of the community, the court stating that the issue is the purpose of the use of
public money or public property and holding that where public school buses are
used to afford transportation to parochial school pupils, an unlawful and uncon-
stitutional use of public funds results.
Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 201 struck down a statute providing
for the transportation of school children attending private or parochial schools
in all cases wherein provision for the transportation of public school pupils was
made, the court finding that the use of any public fund for such transportation
violated constitutional proscriptions against the appropriation or the use of money
or property to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or to the support of
any religious establishment. The court stated that it was clear that such con-
stitutional proscriptions were violated unless it could logically be maintained
that the transportation of pupils to and from the parochial school was of no
benefit to the school itself or to the educational process carried on by the school
but that it was rather, as contended, a benefit inuring exclusively to school chil-
dren. In rejecting that contention, the court stated:
We cannot . . . accept the argument that transportation . . . is not bene-
ficial to, and in aid of, the school. Even legislation providing for trans-
portation of pupils to and from public schools is constitutionally defensible
only as the exercise of a governmental function furthering the maintenance
and development of the common school system. Id. at 64, 135 P.2d at 81.
(Emphasis added.)
The court concluded that it could not be controverted that transportation, in itself,
constituted a component part of the public educational process and that only on
such basis could transportation be afforded to school children. The court indicated
that if the validity of the argument that such transportation inured exclusively
to the benefit of pupils because relieving them of an obligation incident to the
compulsory attendance laws were conceded, the statute would then violate con-
stitutional proscriptions against the use of public funds for the benefit of indivi-
duals, that is, those individuals attending private or parochial schools.
In rejecting the applicability of the "child-benefit" theory, the court in Mat-
thews v. Quinton held that the provision of transportation to school children was
constitutionally defensible only as the provision of an essential to the public edu-
cational process, the cost of which was as much a part of the total expense of that
process as any other item. In this case, the court considered the constitutionality
of a transportation statute which had been passed by the territorial legislature
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or process of the institution is benefited and supported; in these de-
prior to the adoption of the Alaska Constitution. The statute in question pro-
vided transportation to parochial school children to that school attended by them
and the court held that both under the Organic Act of Alaska, ch. 387, 37 Stat.
512 (1912) (codified in scattered sections of 48 U.S.C.) and under the Alaska
Constitution, such a statute would be invalid. The main emphasis of the court's
decision, in holding the legislation violative of the Organic Act and, in indi-
cating that if the legislation were re-enacted, it would contravene the Alaska
Constitution, was that the provision of such transportation to non-public school
pupils would be an expenditure of public funds for other than a "public purpose"
and would result in a "direct benefit" to educational institutions and educational
processes other than the public school system, which was the only educational
process that the state could constitutionally support and maintain. The court
rejected the contention that the intendment of the legislation, as stated therein by
the Legislature, was to promote public health and welfare and indicated that it
was only because transportation constituted a component part of the public
educational process that the same could be afforded to public school students; thus,
the provision of transportation to non-public school students would result in the
effectuation and facilitation of private and sectarian educational processes and
would also constitute the diversion of tax-raised moneys to the benefit of private
individuals or for private purposes, if the theory that only the parochial or private
school child would be benefited by such legislation were accepted.
The validity of the expenditure of public funds by a school district for the
provision of textbooks free of charge to pupils of private and parochial schools
under a state program for such distribution was considered in Dickman v. School
Dist. No. 62C. In this decision, the court held that the statute was violative of
ORE. CONsT. art. I, § 5 providing that "no money shall be drawn from the treasury
for the benefit of any religious, or theological institution." The court held that
the expenditures involved, made from the school district's general fund, were pro-
scribed by the foregoing constitutional provision and violative of the design of
that provision to keep separate the functions of state and church and to prevent
the influence of one upon the other in the area of education. The court noted, and
rejected, the "child-benefit" contention, stating that such theory could not be used
to justify the expenditure of public funds in order to meet the educational needs
of pupils attending private and parochial schools. The court thus held that those
expenditures which aid the child as the pupil of a private or parochial school
could not be regarded as serving the public welfare in the promotion of education,
since the state was proscribed from promoting or aiding any educational process
other than the public educational process embodied in the public school system.
Thus, the Court indicated that the proscription contained in the constitutional
provision was not only against aid to the school or institution but to its functions
as an educational organization, which functions, in the case of parochial schools,
are the promotion of religious education. The court stated that in determining
the validity of an expenditure, the determinative factor was not whether a private
or sectarian institution might derive some benefit or aid therefrom, and that the
function of the institution which was aided by such expenditure was the dis-
positive factor:
[W]here the aid is to the pupils and schools the benefit is identified
with the function of education and if the educational institution is religious,
the benefit accrues to the religious institutions in their function as reigious
institutions. And so it is in the case at bar. Granting that pupils and not
schools are intended to be the beneficiaries of the state's bounty, the aid is
extended to the pupil only as a member of the school which he attends.
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cisions, the dispositive factor is the existence of an aid or benefit to
the private or sectarian educational process conducted by the institu-
tion involved.-
Those decisions which have upheld the providing of publicly-financed
transportation and other "educational" aids to non-public school stu-
dents have done so on the theory that it is within the state's com-
petence in the exercise of its police power to provide for the care,
safety and protection of school children and to promote education by
providing certain tools essential to the functioning of the educational
process; in making this assumption, these courts have disregarded the
fact that the state does not ordinarily stand as parens patriae with
regard to children 95 and that the providing of transportation to public
school children has only withstood the constitutional objection of di-
version of public funds to private purposes because such provision
constitutes a component part of that governmental function embodied
in the public school system.8 These decisions, in regarding the child
as the beneficiary of the protection afforded by transportation and the
recipient of the ability to gain knowledge afforded by the providing of
other "educational" aids, have not taken cognizance of the fact that
such transportation and such "educational" aids are only provided in
connection with the operation of an educational process; by thus re-
garding the child as separate from the educational process in which
he is engaged, these courts have premised that general welfare de-
riving from the protection of children and the advancement of their
knowledge are evidence of the existence of a public purpose or public
function. Once it has been assumed that a public purpose or public
function exists, it follows that the state, because of the strict neu-
trality which it must maintain, cannot deny the benefits resultant from
Whoever else may share in its benefits, such aid is an asset to the schools
themselves. Id. at 543. (Emphasis added.)
The court noted that although it was difficult, in some instances, to determine
whether the particular expenditure aided religious institutions in their "religious
capacity" or in their capacity as members of the community or members of the
public, a clear line was shown when that which was furnished constituted an
integral part of the institution's educational process.
94. Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), appeal dismissed, 368
U.S. 517 (1962); Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941),
appeal dismissed, 317 U.S. 588 (1942); Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, 366
P.2d 533 (Ore. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962) ; Mitchell v. Consolidated
School Dist. No. 201, 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943). See also, Lien v. City
of Ketchikan, in which the court stated: "The test of whether a public purpose is
being served does not depend on the religious or non-religious nature of the agency
that will operate the leased property, but upon the character of the use to which
the property will be put." Id. at 722. (Emphasis added.)
95. See notes 76-79 supra and text supported thereby.
96. See notes 25-34 supra and text supported thereby; and see cases cited
notes 36-37 supra.
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the exercise of that function to any members of the public within its
scope and, therefore, these courts have found no contravention of con-
stitutional proscriptions against aid to sectarian education; through
this process of reasoning, those constitutional strictures upon the
state's ability to promote the general welfare, through aid of or sup-
port to sectarian institutions or sectarian interests and those inter-
dicting the use of public monies for a private benefit have been ne-
gated. This elision of the educational process resultant from con-
sideration of the issues of public purpose and aid or support to private
or sectarian interests and institutions as separate and distinct ques-
tions is reflected in Everson v. Board of Education,7 the first case""
in which the United States Supreme Court considered the isolated
issue of the scope of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the five to four decision upholding the constitutionality of New
Jersey's expenditure of public funds for the transportation of public
97. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
98. In Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929)
the argument was also made that the statute providing for the distribution of free
textbooks to all school pupils violated the due process clause of the federal con-
stitution in providing for the levy and expenditure of public funds for other
than a public purpose; the court answered that argument by stating that the
taxes appropriated under the statute in question constituted a legal expenditure
for a public purpose, that is, the promotion of education. The Louisiana Supreme
Court reaffirmed its holding in the Borden case in a companion case, which was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court and affirmed in Cochran v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). The decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the latter case was restricted to a consideration of the federal
question presented, that is, whether public funds were being used for a private
purpose in contravention of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the federal constitution. The court, in upholding the determination of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, utilized that premise basic to decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in this area, that is, that the state's construction of state
law and determination of the existence of a public purpose, is ordinarily to be
accepted (See, notes 99-101, infra). It should be pointed out that the decision in
Cochran involved no issue with regard to the question of constitutional proscrip-
tions requiring the separation of church and state since those first amendment
provisions were not held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment until the later decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp (Murray v. Curlett), 83
Sup. Ct. 1560 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring),
. . . It is only recently that our decisions have dealt -with the question
whether issues arising under the Establishment Clause may be isolated from
problems implicating the Free Exercise Clause. Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion . . . is in my view the first of our decisions which treats a problem of
asserted unconstitutional involvement as raising questions purely under the
Establishment Clause. A scrutiny of several earlier decisions said by some
to have etched the contours of the clause shows that such cases neither raised
nor decided any constitutional issues under the First Amendment. ...
Id. at 1584.
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and parochial school pupils, the majority opinion stressed the fact
that the state had obviously found that a public purpose would be sub-
served by such an application of tax-raised funds and, noting that the
far reaching authority of the United States Supreme Court to invali-
date state legislation on the ground that no public purpose exists must
be exercised with "extreme caution" 99 and has been exercised only "in
rare instances,"100 the majority opinion apparently accepted the state's
declaration of the existence of a public purpose. 10' In thus assuming
99. See, e.g., Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920) dealing with the general
area of interference by the federal government in the operations of the state and
the fact that, since a primary purpose of the existence of states is to afford to their
citizens those general welfare benefits decreed by state legislatures, the United
States Supreme Court must be careful in dealing with questions involving the
existence of a public purpose not to usurp or prevent the exercise of that general
welfare power. In this case, which is quoted in the majority opinion in the
Everson case (330 U.S. 1, 6) the Court held that every presumption in favor of
the existence of a public purpose, when the same has been found by the state, is
to be indulged and that only where clear and demonstrated transgression of power
exists will judicial interference be authorized; thus, the Court there stated that
policy which has been adhered to by the United States Supreme Court in dealing
with questions in the area of "public purpose":
In the present instance, under the authority of the Constitution and laws
prevailing in North Dakota, the people, the legislature, and the highest court
of the state have declared the purpose for which these several acts were
passed to be of a public nature, and within the taxing authority of the state.
With this united action of people, legislature, and court, we are not at liberty
to interfere unless it is clear, beyond reasonable controversy, that rights
secured by the Federal Constitution have been violated. What is a public
purpose has given rise to no little judicial consideration. Courts, as a rule,
have attempted no judicial definition of a 'public' as distinguished from a
'private' purpose, but have left each case to be determined by its own
peculiar circumstances....
Questions of policy are not submitted to a judicial determination, and the
courts have no general authority of supervision over the exercise of discre-
tion which under our system is reposed in the people or other departments
of government.... Id. at 239-40. (Emphasis added.)
100. See, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937);
City of Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487 (1883); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875), cited by the majority in the Everson case (330
U.S. 1, 6) as examples of those infrequent instances in which the United States
Supreme Court has held that state legislation was invalid because the expenditures
involved were not to be made for a "public purpose."
101. The majority opinion, in discussing the contention that no "public pur-
pose" existed, assumed the existence of a public program by concluding, in effect,
that the provision of transportation to school children, in itself, and apart from
the fact that it is part and parcel of the public educational system and process,
is a public program, that is, one designed to afford protection to children from
the hazards incident to walking, hitchhiking, etc. notwithstanding the fact that
such hazards might be incurred at other times than those instances when children,
who are the objects of this supposed general welfare program, are on their way
to and from school. Thus, the majority, after accepting the existence of a public
program, then went on to say that the fact that the benefits of such program may
inure to certain individuals did not demonstrate that the "public program,"
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the existence of a public program, the majority stated that which
naturally follows from the existence of such a program; that is, that
the state in its position of strict neutrality must afford the benefits
thereof to all persons within the scope of the program in the following
language:
[W] e must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New
Jersey against state-established churches, to be sure that we do
not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending its general
state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their re-
ligious belief.1 0 2 (Emphasis added.)
The dissent of Justice Rutledge,20 3 in which Justices Frankfurter,
Jackson and Burton joined, and the separate dissent of Justice
JacksonW" took issue with the majority opinion only with regard to
the assumption of the existence of a public purpose, the essence of the
difference being that the state cannot, by declaring that a public
purpose exists, make a public function of the providing of aid and
support to a private or sectarian educational process. Thus, the only
issue over which the majority and dissenting opinions disagreed was
that the providing of transportation can be separated from the educa-
whose existence the majority assumed, had a private rather than a public purpose.
For example,
It is much too late to argue that legislation intended to facilitate the op-
portunity of children to get a secular education serves no public purpose....
The same thing is no less true of legislation to reimburse needy parents, or
all parents, for payment of the fares of their children so that they can ride
in public buses to and from schools rather than run the risk of traffic and
other hazards incident to walking or "hitchhiking." . . . Nor does it follow
that a law has a private rather than a public purpose because it provides
that tax-raised funds will be paid to reimburse individuals on account of
money spent by them in a way which furthers a public program. Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7 (1946). (Emphasis added.)
The same proclivity toward acceptance of the state's declaration of the existence
of a "public purpose," and the results which follow from the existence of such
a public purpose, that is, that individuals cannot be denied the benefit of a
public program because of any considerations concerning religion, is seen in the
Court's decision affirming the provision of free textbooks in Cochran v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). Although, as indicated (see note 98
supra) there was no question of the exercise of religious liberty or establishment
of religion involved in the Cochran decision, that case demonstrates the proclivity
of the Supreme Court of the United States toward relying heavily upon the recita-
tion by the highest court of a state with regard to the purpose and effect of state
legislation which has been considered by it:
Viewing the statute as having the effect thus attributed to it (by the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court), we cannot doubt that the taxing power of the state is
exerted for a public purpose. The legislature does not segregate private
schools or their pupils as beneficiaries, or attempt to interfere with any
matters of exclusively private concern. Its interest is education, broadly; its
methods, comprehensive. Individual interests are aided only as the common
interest is safeguarded. Id. at 375. (Emphasis added.)
102. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1946).
103. Id. at 28-72.
104. Id. at 18-28.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss4/3
TRANSPORTATION TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS
tional process which it facilitates. 0 5 That the majority opinion does
not support the proposition that the state, to any extent or in any
amount, can constitutionally aid or support sectarian interests or
religious exercises is strongly reflected in subsequent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court dealing with the scope of the Establish-
105. Compare the statement of the majority opinion in the Everson case with
regard to the scope of the establishment clause with those statements concerning
that scope made by the dissenting Justices; thus, the majority concluded (330 U.S.
1, 16) that under the clause "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion."
Justice Jackson stated, in his separate dissent (330 U.S. 1, 26), with regard
to the scope of the establishment clause, ". . . that the effect of the religious
freedom amendment to our Constitution was to take every form of propagation
of religion out of the realm of things which could directly or indirectly be made
public business and thereby be supported in whole or in part at taxpayers' ex-
pense." And the dissent of Justice Rutledge, stated with regard to the scope of the
clause (330 U.S. 1, 33) that "the prohibition broadly forbids state support, finan-
cial or other, of religion in any guise, form or degree. It outlaws all use of public
funds for religious purposes."
The essence of Mr. Justice Jackson's disagreement with the majority's separa-
tion of the provision of transportation from the educational process, is reflected in
the following statement contained in his separate dissent:
The Constitution says nothing of education. It lays no obligation on the
st'ates to provide schools and does not undertake to regulate state systems of
education if they see fit to maintain them. But they cannot, through school
policy any more than through other means, invade rights secured to citizens
by the Constitution of the United States. . . . One of our basic rights is to
be free of taxation to support a transgression of the constitutional command
that the authorities "shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... " Id. at 21-22.
The essence of the separate dissent of Mr. Justice Rutledge is that the ma-
jority had disregarded the fact that transportation, where it is needed, is an
essential of the educational process and that the majority, by separating the
provision of transportation from that process which it facilitates, had assumed
the existence of a public function or public purpose and therefore, by so assuming,
had decided the issue under the establishment clause; thus, Mr. Justice Rutledge
stated:
We have here then one substantial issue, not two. To say that New Jersey's
appropriation and her use of the power of taxation for raising the funds
appropriated are not for public purposes but are for private ends, is to say
that they are for the support of religion and religious teaching. Conversely,
to say that they are for public purposes is to say that they are not for
religious ones.
This is precisely for the reason that education which includes religious train-
ing and teaching, and its support, have been made matters of private right
and function, not public, by the very terms of the First Amendment. That
is the fact not only in its guaranty of religion's free exercise, but also in the
prohibition of establishments. Id. at 51. (Emphasis added.)
See LA NouE, DECISION FOR THE SIXTIES: PUBLIC FUNDS FOR PAROCHIAL
SCHOOLS?, 21 n.69 (Department of Religious Liberty, National Council of Churches
1963).
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ment Clause and the interrelationship of that clause with the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment . 1
Although it has been indicated that the decision in Everson v.
Board of Education implied that some form of assistance is consonant
with and not violative of the Establishment Clause07 (and the case
has been so cited by state courts in their consideration of challenged
transportation statutes)' 08 and, notwithstanding the fact that there is
some question with regard to the continued viability of the decision,10 D
it is clear that the decision did not foreclose state courts from deter-
mining whether under state constitutions that "form of assistance"
embodied in the providing of publicly-financed transportation to
106. See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp (Murray v.
Curlett), 83 Sup. Ct. 1560 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
107. See, e.g., the following statement of Mr. Justice Brennan with reference
to the Everson decision, School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 83 Sup.
Ct. 1560 (1963):
... Yet even this form of assistance was thought by four Justices of the
Everson court to be barred by the Establishment Clause because too peril-
ously close to that public support of religion forbidden by the First Amend-
ment. Id. at 1592. (Emphasis added.)
Compare Swart v. South Burlington Town School Dist., 122 Vt. 177, 167 A.2d
514 (1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 925 (1961), in which the court held invalid a
provision for the payment of tuition for students attending parochial schools on
the same terms and conditions as such payments were made for students attend-
ing public schools in adjoining towns. The court's decision turned upon the
establishment clause of the first amendment in that the state constitution
contained no prohibition against aid or support to sectarian education and the
court, in thus construing the establishment clause, held that it was without the
scope of the state to make a public purpose or public function out of the promo-
tion and furtherance of sectarian education. Although it was contended that the
tuition payment arrangement constituted a public purpose and program furthering
the promotion of education in the provision of tuition payments for those students
who were compelled to attend high schools in towns other than their own because
none were maintained in their town, the court rejected this contention, stating:
Equitable considerations however compelling, cannot override existing
constitutional barriers. Legislatures and courts alike cannot deviate from
the fundamental law. Id. at 188, 167 A.2d at 520-21.
108. Snyder v. Town of Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal
dismissed, 365 U.S. 299 (1961); Squires v. Inhabitants of City of Augusta, 155
Me. 151, 153 A.2d 80 (1959).
109. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) in which Mr. Justice Douglas, a
member of the five to four majority in the Everson case, stated with respect to
that decision:
My problem today would be uncomplicated but for Everson v. Board of
Education . . . , which allowed taxpayers' money to be used to pay 'the bus
fares of parochial school pupils as a part of the general program under
which' the fares of pupils attending public and other schools were also paid.
The Everson Case seems in retrospect to be out of line with the First Amend-
ment. Its result is appealing, as it allows aid to be given to needy children.
Yet by the same token, public funds could be used to satisfy other needs of
children in parochial schools-lunches, books, and tuition being obvious ex-
amples .... Id. at 443.
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private and parochial school students is proscribed. The decision in
the Everson case is not premised on an equal protection theory, the
majority opinion not only not intimating that parochial and private
school pupils have a right to transportation when such facility is
afforded to children attending public schools, but expressly negating
the existence of any such right ;11o the decision leaves to the states the
question of whether under their constitutions that degree of "support"
involved in the providing of transportation violates constitutional
principles based on the same precepts as those upon which the Estab-
lishment Clause is premised, and the state courts have found them-
selves neither obliged to arrive at the same conclusion nor to accept
the rationale of the Everson decision.""
110. 330 U.S. 1, 16.
111. See Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932, 936-37 (Alaska 1961) (in Everson
the New Jersey court concluded that the state constitution did not prohibit the
use of public funds and the United States Supreme Court ". . . by an unpersua-
sive 5 to 4 decision" upheld the finding of the New Jersey court), appeal dis-
missed, 368 U.S. 517 (1962); Board of Educ. for Ind. School Dist. No. 52 v. An-
tone, 384 P.2d 911, 913 (Okla. 1963) ("On appeal of the Federal question only, the
United States Supreme Court held that the state statute was not violative of
the first amendment of the Federal Constitution; that the state statute would not
be stricken down if it in any way is within the Constitutional power of the state.
Notwithstanding the practical effect of the holding, it essentially constitutes a
ruling that transportation of parochial pupils is not a Federal question, at least
when tested by the First Amendment. As we view it, the decision does not change
the effect of state constitutional provisions."); Visser v. Nooksack Valley School
Dist. No. 506, 33 Wash. 2d 699, 711, 207 P.2d 198, 204-05 (1949) ["although the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court are entitled to the highest considera-
tion as they bear on related questions before this court, we must, in light of the
clear provisions of our state constitution and our decisions thereunder, respectfully
disagree with those portions of the Everson majority opinion which might be
construed, in the abstract, as stating that transportation, furnished at public
expense, to children attending religious schools, is not in support of such schools.
While the degree of support necessary to constitute an establishment of religion
under the first amendment to the Federal constitution is foreclosed from consider-
ation by reason of the decision in the Everson case . . .we are constrained to
hold that the Washington constitution, although based upon the same precepts, is
a clear denial of the rights herein asserted by appellants." (Court's emphasis.)];
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 165, 115 N.W.2d 761, 770
(1962) ("Thus, we deem that the First amendment provision, which prohibits
laws 'respecting an establishment of religion,' lends itself to more flexibility of
interpretation than the provision contained in the last clause of sec. 18, art. I,
of the Wisconsin constitution .... Furthermore ... the weight of authority
since the Everson case is clearly against the constitutionality of providing publicly
financed transportation and related aids to nonpublic school children."); Dick-
man v. School Dist. No. 62C, 366 P.2d 533, 545 (Ore. 1961) ("As we have indi-
cated, Everson . . . is distinguishable from the case at bar. Even if it were not,
our conclusion would be the same."), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962).
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V. CONCLUSION
The majority of decisions which have considered the constitution-
ality of the providing of publicly-financed transportation and other
"educational" aids to non-public school pupils under constitutional
provisions similar to those in Missouri, regardless of whether the
issue has arisen prior to or after the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the Everson case, have invalidated the use of state
power and the expenditure of public monies involved in the providing
of such facilities ;112 some of these decisions have based their conclu-
sions on the ground that the expenditure involved constitutes aid or
support, direct or indirect, to the private or parochial school, 13
while others have reached the more realistic result that the providing
of such facilities constitutes a proscribed aid to the private or pa-
rochial educational process. 14 These decisions recognize that the
providing of transportation is a component part of the educational
process and, in invalidating the furnishing of publicly-financed trans-
portation to private and parochial school students, have held, either
explicitly or implicitly, that application of the principle of the separa-
tion of church and state in the area of education requires the pro-
scription of any aid or support to sectarian schools or institutions of
learning in their capacity of carrying on the function of an educa-
tional process religious in nature.
Those decisions which have sustained the constitutionality of stat-
utes affording publicly-financed transportation and other "educa-
tional" aids to private and parochial school students have done so
112. Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961); State ex rel. Traub v.
Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 Atl. 835 (Super. Ct. 1934), appeal dismissed on
other grounds, 39 Del. 187, 197 Atl. 478 (1938) ; Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y.
200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938) ; Smith v. Donahue, 195 N.Y. Supp. 715, 202 App. Div.
656 (1922); Board of Educ. for Ind. School Dist. No. 52 v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911
(Okla. 1963); Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941), appeal
dismissed, 317 U.S. 588 (1942); Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, 366 P.2d 533
(Ore. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962); Mitchell v. Consolidated School
Dist. No. 201, 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943); State ex rel. Reynolds v.
Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962); see School Dist. No. 8 v.
Stoeper, Civil. No. 6100, D. Colo. July 3, 1961.
113. State ex 'el. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 Atl. 835 (Super. Ct. 1934),
appeal dismissed on other grounds, 39 Del. 187, 197 Atl. 478 (1938); Judd v.
Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938) ; Smith v. Donahue, 195 N.Y.
Supp. 715, 202 App. Div. 656 (1922); Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist. No.
506, 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum,
17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962).
114. Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), appeal dismissed, 368
U.S. 517 (1962) ; Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941), appeal
dismissed, 317 U.S. 588 (1942); Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, 366 P.2d 533
(Ore. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962); Mitchell v. Consolidated School
Dist. No. 201, 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943).
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upon the ground that such legislation constitutes the exercise of the
state's general welfare power."15 In thus upholding the validity of the
provision of such facilities, these cases have recognized that trans-
portation, in fact, is an aid to the educational process, but in attempt-
ing to distinguish between the beneficiaries of this aid and to deter-
mine that recipient to whom the primary benefit of the aid results,
these courts have apparently lost sight of that principle. These courts
have also failed to take cognizance of the fact that it is because the
state cannot interfere with the rights of parents to choose that form
of instruction and education for their children which they wish, that
parents may comply with compulsory education laws by use of
privately owned and operated institutions of learning meeting the
standards for educational accreditment imposed by the state. On
this same ground, the state cannot, without transgression of con-
stitutional proscriptions against the use of public monies for private
purposes, furnish assistance to the exercise of these private rights,
that is, participation in the private educational process carried on by
the private schools or participation in the religious educational process
maintained by the parochial schools.
In certain of the decisions wherein the providing of transportation
and other "educational" aids has been sustained, the constitutional
provisions involved have been distinguishable from those in Missouri
and the decisions have turned in part upon such distinctions. 16 More-
115. Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946); Snyder v.
Town of Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960) (dictum), appeal dis-
missed 365 U.S. 299 (1961); Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d 930
(1945) ; Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929),
aff'd sub nom. Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930);
Adams v. County Comm'rs, 180 Md. 550, 26 A.2d 377 (Ct. App. 1942); Board of
Educ. v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 Atl. 628 (Ct. App. 1938) ; Chance v. Mississippi
State Textbook Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
132 N.J.L. 98, 39 A.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1944), rev'd, 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333
(Ct. Err. & App. 1945), aff'd, 330 U.S. 1 (1946); See Squires v. Inhabitants of
City of Augusta, 155 Me. 151, 153 A.2d 80 (1959).
116. Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946) (in this case
the court stressed the fact that its constitutional provisions did not proscribe
"indirect aid" to denominational schools whereas such a provision was contained
in the constitutions of states in which the provision of transportation had been in-
validated) ; Snyder, v. Town of Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 386-87, 161 A.2d 770, 777
(11. . the word 'support' in article seventh was never intended to be employed in
so narrow a sense as to prevent every sort of incidental public assistance to, and
encouragement of, religious activity."); Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook
Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So.2d 706 (1941) (the court's decision of legality with re-
gard to the provision of publicly-financed textbooks turned on that constitutional
provision proscribing "control" of any part of school or other "educational funds"
by sectarian interests and the court premised its conclusion of constitutionality
on the determination that the mere availing of the benefits of an appropriation
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
over in certain of these decisions the courts have stressed the fact
that no additional expense would accrue by virtue of furnishing the
use of public school transportation facilities to private and parochial
school students; these decisions, utilizing the principle of de minimis,
have held that, since public school transportation constitutes a valid
expenditure of public monies, the fact that an "incidental" benefit of
such expenditure inures to sectarian interests and institutions is not
invalidating."17 Other decisions in this area which have invalidated
the providing of publicly-financed transportation have recognized the
fact that only a small or negligible expense is imposed upon the public
by virtue of the providing of public school facilities in affording trans-
portation to private and parochial school students but have rejected
the applicability of the de minimis doctrine to the area of the separa-
tion of church and state in the field of education ;:18 decisions in
Missouri, dealing with issues other than the providing of transporta-
tion, have similarly indicated their rejection of the utilization of
de minimis with regard to proscriptions against aid or support to
sectarian education. 119 In this connection it should be noted that the
recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Engel v.
did not result in control of such funds, since the use thereof was controlled only
by the purposes for which the legislature had designated it).
117. Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946) (holding that
where the main purpose of an enactment is lawful and an incidental or immaterial
benefit results to some person or organization, which benefit is not directly per-
mnitted by law, this incidental benefit alone will not defeat the legislation and also
differentiating other decisions invalidating the provision of transportation to non-
public school pupils on the ground that in those decisions it was shown that under
the statute there involved there would have been required direct expenditure of
considerable sums to purchase additional buses whereas under the statute being
considered by this court only existing public school transportation facilities
would be used); Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d 930 (1945) (semble) ;
Everson v. Board of Educ., 132 N.J.L. 98, 39 A.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1944), rev'd,
133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945), aff'd, 330 U.S. 1 (1946)
(since the transportation invclved was to be accomplished by the use of public
school buses over established public school routes, the payment of any additional
expense out of local taxes would only be the payment of an "incidental" expense
and this was not invalidating because local school districts were authorized to
raise funds by special district taxes to defray current charges and expenses of the
public schools including transportation and "incidental" expenses).
118. Board of Educ. for Ind. School Dist. No. 52 v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla.
1963) ; Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941), appeal dismissed,
317 U.S. 588 (1942) ; Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 201, 17 Wash. 2d
61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115
N.W.2d 761 (1962) ; State ex rel. Weiss v. District Ed., 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967
(1890).
119. See Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8, 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d
573 (1953) ; Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (1941).
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Vita e 20 significantly demonstrates that in cases involving separation
of church and state questions, the doctrine of de minimis has no
applicability whatever. In that case both the majority and concurring
opinions adverted to the fact that the amount of teacher time, and
consequently public expenditure, involved in recitation of the Regents'
Prayer was extremely small but pointed out that in the application
of the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses, it is not the extent
but the fact of governmental interference that is constitutionally
invalidating.
The Constitution of Missouri has imposed upon the Legislature a
mandate to provide for the free public education of the youth of this
state in order to assure the "general diffusion of knowledge and
intelligence.., essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties
of the people. '"121 The expenditure of public funds in aid or support
of the operation of this public educational process thus enjoined upon
the Legislature is constitutionally defensible against attack because it
serves that public purpose embodied in the public school system; it is
submitted that it is upon this basis, and this basis only, that the
providing of publicly-financed transportation to school students can
be upheld. The Legislature has provided a public educational system, a
component part of which is the providing of transportation in certain
instances; this public educational process, with all its facilities and
component parts, is a public purpose and public function which the
state has fully and completely assumed and performed for the welfare
and benefit of the entire class of its citizens within the object and
scope of that purpose and function. When a child is withdrawn from
the scope of that object and purpose by placement in a private or
parochial school, he becomes a part of the private or parochial educa-
tional process there involved; no public benefit or public purpose can
be obtained in providing that which the state has completely provided
at public expense, and therefore, it is submitted, that any expenditure
to aid or assist such private or sectarian educational processes is not
constitutionally supportable.
120. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
121. MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
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